Russias Revisionist View Regarding the European Security Architecture Causes of the Crisis and the Goals of the Kremlin
Abstract
The article outlines the nature and origins of the security architecture existing in Europe prior to the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, and analyses the conflict of interests and disagreements between Russia and the West in this regard. The article aims to examine the factors contributing to the formation of Russia’s revisionist view regarding said architecture. Conclusions drawn from analysis indicate that Russia’s attempts to revise the European security architecture are determined by the Kremlin’s aspiration to retain the ‘great power’ status, on the one hand, and its perception of the foundational principles of international system and the global order through the prism of the primacy of power-politics and the spheres of influence, on the other hand.
Ana Chitaladze
The post-Cold War European security architecture, which was supposed to uphold peace on the continent through rules-based, liberal international order, faces substantial challenges, first and foremost due to Russia.
The mobilization of Russian military forces along the Ukrainian border from December of 2021, the Kremlin’s illicit recognition of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions as independent entities and the full-scale invasion initiated on the 24th of February of 2022, sparking the largest crisis in Europe since the Second World War, are considered as the turning points that caused radical alterations within the European security architecture.
Nevertheless, over more than a decade, the aforementioned architecture faced various crises of significant nature, all of which were ultimately caused by Russia. The Kremlin’s aggression perpetrated against Georgia in 2008, occupation and recognition as independent entities of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region, and the annexation of Crimea in 2014 undermined the foundational principles of the existing international order, creating dangerous precedents in terms of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Such events clearly illustrated the trend where the existing architecture was unable to prevent crises, especially as Russia’s ambitions continued to increase. Additionally, the crisis of European security architecture is manifested in the cases of violation of security-related conventions, agreements and regimes to which both the West and Russia belonged, and in the subsequent loss of legitimacy of those arrangements.
The article analyses the existing security architecture in Europe prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, examining the different perceptions of threats by the West and Russia and Russia’s revisionist attitudes towards the above-mentioned order. Finally, the article focuses on Russia’s goals, which gave birth to the current crisis on the European continent.
The Helsinki Final Act (1975) and the Paris Charter (1990) are considered as the foundational documents of the post-Cold War European security and political architecture, signed by both the USSR and the Western countries. These agreements provided the foundations for the liberal order, which primarily focused on human rights protection. By becoming a party to the Paris Charter, the USSR was supposed to be part of the ‘indivisible security’ in Europe and of the Common European Home, which required commitment to the principles of democracy, human rights protection, rule of law and the non-use of force. Additionally, it required the recognition that every state had the right to “to choose their own security arrangements.”1 The next turning point for the European security architecture is considered to be the dissolution of the USSR and the termination of the Warsaw pact, which resulted in the complete overhaul of the nature of said architecture both in terms of practical, as well as institutional dimensions, with NATO assuming functions associated with guarantying security on the continent. The role of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has become increasingly nominal in this regard.2
It can be argued that, despite establishing close relations with NATO in the 1990s, Russia failed to acquire a key position in this new architecture. Thus, considering the rising tensions between Russia and the West over the recent decades, the Kremlin found itself increasingly ambitious to carve out a place for itself within the aforementioned framework.
Treaties on conventional arms control and confidence building acted as foundational documents upon which Europe’s post-Cold War security architecture rested, with both the US and Russia becoming parties to said agreements; The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) (1990), the Open Skies Treaty (OST) (1992), and OSCE’s Vienna Document on the Negotiations on Confidence – and Security-Building Measures (VDOC) (1990, latest revision – 2011) were among the most significant series of agreements in this regard. Nevertheless, the above-mentioned treaties have been less functional lately: After suspending its participation in the treaty in 2007, Russia de-facto left the CFE agreement in 2015; in 2020, the US left the Open Skies treaty due to Russia’s constant violation of its provisions; Russia also regularly disrupts the process of revision of the Vienna Documents in the OSCE, neglecting its responsibilities, which is clearly evident from the annexation of Crimea and invasion of Ukraine, along with other similar activities.3
The violation of the principles of the Vienna Documents by Russia was recently discussed within the framework of OSCE several times.4 Additionally, in 2019, the US left the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), as Russia violated the principles of the agreement by placing new rocket sites. In turn, Russia considered the placement of NATO’s missile defence systems in Poland and Romania as a violation of the aforementioned treaty.5
Along with the erosion of legal foundations of the European security architecture, escalation and risks also increase due to the strengthening of military capabilities/potential, as well as how the West and Russia perceive threats from each other.
The West perceives the development of military capabilities by Russia directed towards NATO member-states as a threat, especially in terms of those capabilities that can target NATO’s strategic infrastructure and air space, and contribute to the increase in the effectiveness of Russia’s military activities. Russia has a capability to use land-based projectiles against NATO member-states without warning. The allies are concerned by the placement of the following types of weaponry: 3M-14 Kalibr systems, 1500-2500 km maritime cruise missiles (SLCM), Iskanders, 400-500 km ballistic missile systems, 9M729, etc. Additionally, the Alliance perceives Russia’s A2/AD systems as a threat to its domination in the Baltic and Black Sea regions.6
Russia, in turn, views NATO and its new containment policy as a direct threat, namely the strengthening of NATO’s capability along Russia’s borders, improvement of combat-readiness of the Alliance and increased military spending, far exceeding Russia’s budget. In this regard, the Kremlin places particular emphasis on the Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) and Long-range Rocket System (LRS). Additionally, Russia’s Military Doctrine points out that the development of NATO’s military infrastructure along its border poses one of the most pressing foreign military threats. Moreover, Russia perceives US and Allied naval vessels, armed with rocket systems (MK-41 launcher, Aegis system, Tomahawk SLCMs), as a distinct threat. 7
Along with the failure to carve out its place within the system and the debilitating rivalry with the West, over time, Russia’s views regarding the European security architecture became increasingly critical and revisionist in nature.
The draft agreements with NATO8 and the US9 published on December 17th of 2021 act as the best publicly available representation of Russia’s preferred mode for Europe’s security architecture. According to said documents, Russia views the fulfilment of the following demands as the necessary preconditions for its security:
- Cessation of NATO enlargement: the Alliance must not receive new members into its ranks – Ukraine, Georgia, and other states;
- No military forces and equipment are to be placed in countries that became members of NATO after 1997 (before the Alliance’s eastward enlargement);
- The US and NATO must not place military bases in non-member former Soviet republics, refraining from using their infrastructure for military purposes and halting bilateral military cooperation;
- No placement of medium and short-range rocket systems in locations that threaten the territory of the other party; the Parties must not place nuclear weapons beyond their borders, retracting installations that are based abroad;
- No brigade and higher-level military drills, or other related activities are to take place in border zones.
“Security guarantees” presented in 2021 were not the first instance when Russia expressed its revisionist view on the European security architecture. In June of 2008 the Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev, stated that the existing security architecture was inadequate, presenting an alternative version of the system. The main emphasis was made on the incapable and exclusionary nature of NATO and OSCE, which isolated and neglected the interests of Russia as well as other European states. Russia’s vision for the revision of the European security environment was also sent to various international organisations including NATO, the EU, and OSCE in November of 2009. According to Russia, ineffectiveness of the existing security architecture was elucidated by the failure to adequately address the crises in the Balkan and Caucasus regions. Additionally, the Kremlin criticized NATO’s enlargement, which, from the Russian perspective, acted as the primary reason for the rising tensions with the Alliance, dubbing the organization as an outdated (a Cold War institution) reflection of a block-based global order. Furthermore, the Medvedev document noted that the existing European security architecture was overly ideological and that democracy ought not to play a role in terms of block membership. This too, according to Russia, is a reflection of ideological rivalry characteristic of the Cold War, thus irrelevant.10
In October 2008 in Evian (France) Medvedev stated that the new European security architecture must be based on the following five principles: no use or threat of force; equal security; no state or international organisation to have exclusive rights on guaranteeing peace and security in Europe; arms control; and limitation of the military strength.11
Russia’s attempt to present an alternative vision for a new European security architecture, aspiring to carve out a place on the international stage on its own terms is nothing new. Starting with Gorbachev, through to Yeltsin/Primakov, Moscow kept presenting its own vision for a Pan-European security system. Gorbachev’s idea known as the “Common European Home” implied that Russia was an integral part of Europe, whereas, Yeltsin’s proposal sought achieving European security within the framework of the OSCE.12
The Tsarist, Soviet, and modern Russian policies share a common drive towards the attainment and maintenance of a superpower status, of a pole of strong force. Russia’s political ambitions did not wane after the dissolution of the USSR, however, the employed imperialist policies often changed in appearance; for example, under Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrey Kozirev, integration with the West was considered a national interest for the Kremlin. Nevertheless, the subsequent Primakov doctrine entailed the return to ‘great power’ (великая держава) politics.
Putin’s main inspiration comes from the ultranationalist Tsarist Russian Empire, rather than the USSR, which is clearly illustrated by Russia’s approach towards Ukraine’s statehood and nationhood.13 Russia envisages the revival of the 19th century ideas of the European Concert, rooted in balance of power politics and zones of influence.14
Recognition and respect for the rival’s zone of influence was one of the main principles during the Cold War. Afterwards, however, according to Western perspective, the European political order was to be predicated by democratic values and human right protection, with cooperation among nations and freedom of choice in foreign policy for states guaranteed. Despite the fact that the leaders of the USSR accepted the toppling of Central and Eastern European allied regimes, resulting in the reunification of Germany, as a fact, the successive Russian state never retracted its claims in its former zone of influence, especially, when it came to the former Soviet republics. This is precisely why the expansion of NATO and the EU, and the democratisation of the aforementioned zone, came under such an active criticism from Russia.15
From the mid-1990s Russian administrations and experts considered multi-polarity as the only form of global order that would guarantee stability. According to Russia, ‘US hegemony’ and ‘uni-polarity’ will, thus, naturally be terminated in the nearest future. Yevgeny Primakov emphasized the ‘rise of the rest’ in comparison to US power, prognosticating the transition towards multi-polarity, where Russia would act as a significant centre of force.16
Putin’s vision, formulated after 2011, goes even further, envisaging a return to the Cold War-style bipolar global order, where Russia would act as a counterbalance to the EU and NATO, as the successor state of the USSR. It is, therefore, obvious that Russia, as a ‘great power’, would like to have the right to veto any decision made on the international stage.
In her book, Putin’s World: Russia against the West and with the Rest, Angela Stent analyzes Russia’s foreign policy, outlining the Kremlin’s views and goals regarding the European security architecture:
- Russia’s declared ambition is to sit among the actors responsible for decision-making on the global stage;
- Former Soviet republics must be viewed as ‘Russia’s backyard’, where the Kremlin and its interests enjoy preferential treatment;
- The liberal international order birthed by the dissolution of the USSR must be replaced with a post-Western one, with Russia, the US, and China carving out their exclusive zones of influence;
- Absolute sovereignty is a luxury enjoyed only by ‘great powers’.17
Differing views on the concept of sovereignty greatly determine the rivalling visions held by Russia and the West on the global stage. Putin’s 2017 statement, in which he stressed that sovereignty can only be exercised by a handful of states (China, India, US, Russia, etc.)18 acts as a justification for aggressive behaviour against Russia’s neighbours.
Moscow’s ambition to play a key role in the European order19, while retaining influence21 over former Soviet republics in its ‘backyard’20, turned the Russian Federation into a revisionist power. Over the recent years, the Kremlin attempted to undermine popularity of liberal democracy, via supporting ultranationalist and anti-establishment forces.22 Along with the increased tensions with the West and intensification of authoritarian rule, Russian policies became progressively more aggressive, culminating in the invasion of Ukraine on the 24th of February of 2022.
Indivisible and equal security represented key principles of the Helsinki and Paris charters in European affairs, becoming dominant after the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, increasing Russian ambitions to ‘carve out a place’ of its own within the European political order completely eroded the legal foundations of the aforementioned architecture, which was followed by the rowing trend of concern by both Russia and the West regarding the threats emanating from each other. After the invasion of Georgia in 2008 and annexation of Crimea in 2014, it became clear that the existing security architecture failed to prevent crises on the European continent due to snowballing Russian aggression. Russia’s pretensions became progressively clear and demanding.
The article discussed Russia’s preferred vision for the European security architecture, which is best exemplified by the document presented by Moscow in December of 2021, concerning the Kremlin’s proposals and views. Russia’s main demand concerns its ‘zone of influence’ across former Soviet republics, along with cessation of dissemination of liberal democratic ideas in its ‘backyard’ and stopping NATO’s enlargement. The article underscores that Russia’s revisionist approach regarding sovereignty as a notion differs from that of the West, with only ‘great powers’ having the privilege of exercising full sovereignty. Therefore, Russia violates territorial integrity of its neighbours, neglecting their right to freely choose a foreign policy vector.
The examination of Russia’s vision regarding the existing European security architecture outlines the causes and wishes of the Kremlin that act as cornerstones of Russian revisionist policies. Considering that the Kremlin tends to favour primacy of force, violating sovereignty of other states, Russia’s traditional aspiration of being a ‘great power’/’centre of force’ on a global stage and having a right to veto any decision concerning European affairs is determined by Russia’s wish to ‘carve up Europe into zones of influence’. Tsarist Russia is Putin’s main source of inspiration. He wants to see the revival of the European Concert – an antipode of the existing European security architecture, which was rooted in the balance of power and zones of influence.
* Ana Chitaladze – Attaché at the Department of Security Policy and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Division of Euro-Atlantic Integration Coordination, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia
Contents
Peaceful Neighbourhood -Georgia’s Role and Vision
Lasha Darsalia
Russias Revisionist View Regarding the European Security Architecture Causes of the Crisis and the Goals of the Kremlin
Ana Chitaladze
EU-China Rivalry and Sanction Policy
Davit Pipinashvili
New Enlargement Policy – The EU’s Renaissance
Lika Chipashvili
Military Alliance of the US, UK, and Australia (AUKUS) Minilateralism and Georgia’s
Imedi (Ivi) Alshibaia