New Enlargement Policy – The EU’s Renaissance
Abstract
Which of the following should the EU prioritize: a deeper internal integration among member-states or the further enlargement of the Union? –This issue has always been a topic of discussion in the social and political debates in Europe. Said issue has gained further momentum considering the Russo-Ukrainian war and the submission of applications for accession by the ‘Associated Trio’. This article aims at analyzing the EU’s current enlargement policy. It discusses the root causes of the EU’s ‘Enlargement Fatigue’, the impact of the war in Ukraine on the future of the European project, and the further prospects of the EU enlargement.
Lika Chipashvili
“We have recently modernized negotiation procedures concerning accession into the EU; however, we acknowledge that today’s Europe is in no position to admit additional members to become a union of 31, 32, let alone 33 states”- stated Emmanuel Macron, the President of France (which was acting as the chair of the Council of the European Union), on January 19th of 2022, during his address to the European Parliament.1
As before, the main internal reason hindering the EU enlargement today is the pressing need to reform the Union. Deeper integration as opposed to a more enlarged Union is the idea that has always been at the forefront of social and political discourse in Europe and has remained so throughout the past seven decades of the existence of the European integration project.
In fact, this issue is even more relevant today, as the Russo-Ukrainian war wages on. On the one hand, due to the necessity to achieve strategic autonomy for the EU, especially in terms of military and security dimensions, on the other, due to the change in the enlargement policies of the Union within the context of the accession applications submitted by Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova.
The analysis of the current enlargement policy of the EU is the main focus of this article. It begins with an outline of factors that determine the EU’s Enlargement Fatigue. Then, focus shifts to the impact of the Russo-Ukrainian war on the EU and its enlargement policy, with a discussion regarding the future prospects of the enlargement of the Union bringing the paper to a close.
For the seven decades of its existence, the EU went through seven enlargement rounds, contracting only once after Brexit. The founding organization, the European Coal and Steel Community, comprising six states, was set up in 1951 in order to ensure economic prosperity and peace on the continent. Ultimately, 27 states and over 450 million people joined the ’big European family’. The integration of new states into the European peace project took place progressively every decade or so. The 2004 round of ‘big bang’ enlargement is considered to be the most historic of said events, when ten new members were admitted to the club, finally realizing the union of Europe in one way or another. European unity, thus, further solidified and expanded to include countries that have shores on the Black Sea, when Bulgaria and Romania joined in 2007 (with Croatia becoming a member in 2013).
This progressively inevitable reality of unification of European nations was only ever disrupted on December 31 of 2020, when the UK officially left the Union, reversing the long-standing trend of enlargement. This event, unprecedented in Europe, is considered to be one of the main causes behind the EU’s ‘Enlargement Fatigue’. Based on the results of the 2016 referendum, the implementation of the will of the British people took over five years of negotiations and action. Therefore, Europe’s agenda became engulfed in the ‘Brexit’ fiasco. Nevertheless, overall unity of the EU comprised of the 27 remaining members arguably became even more solidified, with the necessity for enlargement becoming equally apparent.
Contrary to the rising populist sentiments and ‘Brexit’, trust towards the EU from the European public only solidified. For example, according to the public opinion survey,2if in 2016 only 36% trusted the EU while 67% identified themselves as EU citizens, the same survey today shows that 49% trust the Union while the clear majority of 72% identify as citizens of the European Union. Paradoxically, public opinion has also shifted in terms of support for the enlargement of the Union. The percentage of those in support of the enlargement increased from 39 (2016) to 46 (2021). Additionally, it is notable that despite ‘Brexit’, no other member-state has yet submitted application to leave the EU.
Migration and associated challenges are also among the causes of ‘Enlargement Fatigue’, which has always figured on the agenda of nationalistically minded populist groups. In this regard, the 2015-2016 migrant crisis is of particular significance, which resulted in the reinstatement of internal border regimes across ten Schengen member-states, aiming to curb illegal migration. Furthermore, considering the ongoing conflicts and dire socio-economic conditions, as well as consequences of climate change, the influence of potential migrational processes on Europe remain noteworthy.3As a result, the European public names migration as one of the central challenges currently faced by the EU.4This, in turn, significantly reduces the interest of European politicians towards the idea of the EU enlargement.
Paired with the aforementioned facts, reduced loyalty towards common European values and democratic backsliding in several member-states are considered to be among the leading causes of ‘Enlargement Fatigue’. Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania are rather problematic in this regard. Therefore, solidifying foundational European values in EU politics requires, now more than ever, an introduction of a new agenda. For example, for the first time in EU history, a precondition for member-states to become beneficiaries of the 2021-2027 post-Pandemic economic reconstruction financial package was determined to be the level of respect towards democracy and the rule of law.5Starting from 2020, another novelty was introduced by the European Commission concerning annual assessment of the situation with regard to the rule of law across the European Union, namely, the assessment would consider four dimensions: independent judiciary; combatting corruption; balance of power between different branches of government; and media-freedom and pluralism.6
Among other factors contributing to ‘Enlargement Fatigue’, can be considered issues associated with climate change, environmental protection and the Pandemic. The European public views climate change as one of the most significant challenges faced by the EU in terms of unity and, therefore, themes of green transformation and sustainable economic cooperation are high on the European political agenda.
Finally, the aforementioned factors causing ‘Enlargement Fatigue’ are compounded and further exacerbated by the ongoing war in Ukraine, affecting the functioning of the European Union in the long-term.
The Russo-Ukrainian war had a fundamental impact the EU both internally and in terms of foreign policy of Brussels. Deeper integration and internal reforms became top issues overshadowing enlargement policies, especially in terms of security and defense dimensions.
This rather outdated model of strategic autonomy for Europe was revived after the election of the French President Emmanuel Macron in 20177, becoming more and more relevant as France assumed the position of chair of the Council of the European Union, while a war raged on in Ukraine. For the first time in EU history, in order to strengthen ‘European Defense’, member states adopted a ‘Strategic Compass’, supporting the idea of establishing a united military and increasing defense capabilities.8 It is also notable that article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty has actively been evoked lately in the European discourse. According to said article: “If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power.”9
The general fragility and state of affairs within the transatlantic community provides an increasingly stronger impetus to the necessity to ensure overall strategic autonomy of Europe. Despite the fact that unity of the US and Europe is exemplary especially considering the challenges associated with Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine, in the long run, changes in foreign policy interests of Washington must be closely tracked, as the US shifts its focus towards the Asia-Pacific region. The clearly defined confrontation between the US and China will, thus, inevitably lead to the Europeans picking up the burden of the defense of Europe. Compared to the ‘Cold-War’ period, the US and the EU interests have significantly diverged, affecting the degree of unity in the transatlantic region.
Russia is not alone when it comes to rivalry with the US. The People’s Republic of China is also considered a primary geopolitical threat to Washington. This necessitates the formulation of an independent European policy on China. The fragility of transatlantic relations is clearly evidenced by the decision made by the US last year concerning the withdrawal of their military presence in Afghanistan lasting two decades, without consulting European allies. The concurrent ratification of the so-called AUKUS military cooperation agreement with Australia and the UK also underscores the differences in terms of foreign policy interests of the US and the EU. This resulted in the termination of the multi-billion project (of the century) with the long-time US partner of France in 2016. Ultimately, the aforementioned issues combine to build the foundations for a united Anglosphere, clearly elucidating the sharp differences in the priorities held by the US and the EU.
The direct impact of the Russo-Ukrainian war, as well as the looming economic and migrant crisis on internal politics of the EU continues to increase. The effects of the unprecedented and large-scale sanctions imposed upon Russia also play a significant role in this regard, especially in terms of transition towards long-term energy independence. The aforementioned dimensions are further exacerbated due to the unprecedented flow of migrants, numbering around five million Ukrainians that entered Europe due to the Russian aggression.
The above-mentioned results of Russia’s unjustifiable and unprovoked aggression against Ukraine only made it more evident that the issue of internal integration is dominating over enlargement policies. Nevertheless, simultaneously, the continuation of the enlargement policy bears no less significance in terms of protection of European values, including via integrating the ‘Associated Trio’, which will be perceived as an act of support towards self-determination and free will of sovereign states. Such actions are especially needed, as the Russian imperialist outlook is based on centuries-old notions of zones of influence, military superiority and balance of power politics. Thus, Russia finds itself in a confrontation with not only Ukraine, but also the liberal international order of the 21st century, which is based on sovereignty and freedom of choice for individual states.
The EU’s enlargement policy experienced a pivotal shift as a result of the Russo-Ukrainian war. Ukraine officially submitted its application for accession into the EU on February 28th, with Georgia and Moldova following suit on March 3rd. Currently, four states in the Western Balkan region enjoy the EU candidacy status: North Macedonia (since 2005); Montenegro (since 2010); Serbia (since 2012); and Albania (since 2014); with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo having received a potential candidate status.10Turkey is also considered as a candidate state11that began accession negotiations with the EU in 2005, however, due to a combination of several factors, the process remains frozen and futile.
Despite the fact that the European perspective of the Western Balkan region was recognized all the way back in 2000 during the first EU-Western Balkans Summit, and in spite of the irreversible integration of said states into the EU’s common political, economic and culture sphere, it must be noted that the overall level of integration of Western Balkan states remains unsatisfactory. Endemic causes contributing to this can be attributed to general lack of efforts in terms of ensuring the rule of law and democracy, including “state capture”, prevalence of corruption and organized crime. There is also the issue of increased migration, low birth rates, etc. An existential challenge of establishing friendly relations in the neighborhood, which is among EU preconditions for joining the organization, remains an issue for the region.
Due to the aforementioned reasons, along with a collection of other less significant causes, the negotiation on accession into the EU for states of the Western Balkan region is not progressing at a satisfactory rate. For example, within the framework of the accession negotiations for Montenegro initiated in 2012, only 3 issues have been covered from the overall 33 issues, with the rest being subject to further negotiations; similar negotiations initiated with Serbia in 2014 also only saw the completion of negotiations on 18 issues, with an additional 2 remaining temporarily closed.12
Such comparatively slow progress in terms of accession negotiations for states of the Western Balkan region, thus, hints at the formation of a certain ‘status quo’ regarding accession into the EU.
In this regard, conditions are different for the ‘Associated Trio’. Despite the fact that Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova have not yet received candidacy, compared to the aforementioned Balkan candidates for accession into EU, said three countries are in compliance of more of the Copenhagen Criteria, with Georgia leading the pack.13
After initiating negotiations on accession into the organization, in order to officially grant candidacy, the EU will have to deliberate upon the provision of the European Perspective for Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova.
The most recent enlargement of the EU took place in 2013, when the “greater, united European family” was joined by Croatia. Within the context of expansion, the reformation of the functions of the Union is actively debated by European leaders, including the issue of transition to a “Two-Speed Europe” model*.14
Akin to the aforementioned enlargement policy, the necessity to review and redesign the EU’s neighbourhood policy is also clear. Considering that the members of the “Associated Trio” have already officially submitted their bids for candidacy, casually and reasonably speaking, the existing format of the Eastern Partnership Initiative loses credibility. Recognizing Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova as potential member-states of the EU will alter the external borders of the organization, requiring the formulation of a reviewed vision on a neighbourhood policy for the new frontier. Additionally, judging by the existing EU approach towards the Russian Federation and Belarus, the organization faces the challenge of determining a completely new “neighbourhood” policy.
The existing situation makes it clear that the current EU enlargement policy requires revision and strategic transformation, as “Europe is not created according to a linear plan, rather being built on the foundation of exerted effort and taken steps.”15This Schuman declaration is as relevant today as it was 72 years ago, when the very essence of the European idea was determined to focus on the “unification of all European nations”.16This seems to have become even more of a pressing issue, with the need for unification looming imminent, considering the increasing geopolitical challenges in the modern world, such as: forceful alteration of sovereign borders, closer cooperation between authoritarian regimes and the rise of the national-populist movements across the continent. Additionally, historically speaking, enlargement policies were among the most successful and progressive policies in EU’s toolkit, ensuring seventy-two years of peaceful development, economic prosperity, and, most importantly, unity on the European continent.
Today it is also of essential significance to strengthen the EU’s role as a potent international actor on the world stage. Taking steps in terms of enlargement is precisely the precondition for this; however, it depends on the degree of agreement among European politicians, especially when it comes to providing the “Associated Trio” with the status of an EU candidate. For the sake of efficiency, EU’s expansion policies must also be discussed within the framework of the accession of Balkan states and the aforementioned trio, focusing on the ‘more for more’ principle.
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/36248 [4] European Union. n.d. “Standard Eurobarometer 95 – Spring 2021.”
https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2532 [5] European Commission. n.d. “Rule of law conditionality regulation.” https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/eu-budget/protection-eu-budget/rule-law-conditionality-regulation_en [6] European Commission. 2020. “Rule of law report – methodology.”
https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/2020-rule-law-report-methodology_en [7] Elysee. 2017. “Discours d’Emmanuel Macron pour une Europe souveraine, unie, démocratique.” September 26, 2017. https://www.elysee.fr/front/pdf/elysee-module-795-fr.pdf [8] European Council/The Council of the European Union. 2022. “A Strategic Compass for a stronger EU security and defence in the next decade.” 21 March, 2022.
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/21/a-strategic-compass-for-a-stronger-eu-security-and-defence-in-the-next-decade/ [9] EUR-Lex. n.d. “Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union […] Article 42 (ex Article 17 TEU).” https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12008M042 [10] European Commission. n.d. “European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations: Candidate Status.”
https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/enlargement-policy/negotiations-status_en [11] Ibid. [12] European Commission. 2021. “EU-Western Balkans relations.” October, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/system/files/2021-10/18102021_eu_wb_relations.pdf [13] Emerson, Michael, Blockmans, Steven, Cenusa, Denis, Tamara, Kovziridze and Movchan, Veronika. 2021. “Balkan and Eastern European Comparisons: Building a New Momentum for the European integration of the Balkan and Eastern European associated states.” https://www.ceps.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Balkan-and-Eastern-European-Comparisons.pdf [14] Vie publique. 2022. “ Entretien de M. Clément Beaune, secrétaire d’État aux affaires européennes, à France Inter le 10 mars 2022, sur les questions de l’énergie et de la défense au sein de l’Union européenne et situation militaire et géopolitique en Ukraine.“ https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/284420-clement-beaune-10032022-situation-militaire-et-geopolitique-en-ukraine [15] European Union. n.d. “Déclaration de Schuman – mai 1950.” https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/history-eu/1945-59/schuman-declaration-may-1950_fr [16] Ibid.
Notes:
* The idea of “two-speed”, or “multi-speed” Europe (“changing geometry”) entails a differentiated approach to the process of integration of individual states into the Union, which takes into consideration the uneven footing of the applicants in terms of capabilities for them to engage in and reap the benefits of the common market, the Eurozone, four fundamental freedoms, etc.
* Lika Chipashvili – First Secretary, Division of West Europe of the Department of European Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia
Contents
Peaceful Neighbourhood -Georgia’s Role and Vision
Lasha Darsalia
Russias Revisionist View Regarding the European Security Architecture Causes of the Crisis and the Goals of the Kremlin
Ana Chitaladze
EU-China Rivalry and Sanction Policy
Davit Pipinashvili
New Enlargement Policy – The EU’s Renaissance
Lika Chipashvili
Military Alliance of the US, UK, and Australia (AUKUS) Minilateralism and Georgia’s
Imedi (Ivi) Alshibaia