Military Alliance of the US, UK, and Australia (AUKUS) Minilateralism and Georgia’s
Abstract
The article discusses the security partnership formed between the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and Australia – AUKUS, along with the reasons and potential outcomes for both the region in question, as well as the world in general. The article analyses minilateralism as a modern, effective form of military partnership, focusing on the opportunities it provides for Georgia as a useful tool for the purposes of ensuring security.
Imedi (Ivi) Alshibaia
On September 15 of 2021, the world’s attention was diverted to the formation of a trilateral alliance between the US, UK, and Australia. The new partnership entails the strengthening of cooperation in terms of security in the Indo-Pacific region.1 After the Five Eyes intelligence partnership framework2, the word “Anglosphere”, bearing both positive and negative connotations, has again entered the public domain.3
The formation of the aforementioned alliance received varying responses. China stated its negative attitude towards the partnership in an immediate manner, calling on the members of AUKUS to drop the Cold War mentality; Australia also became a target of attacks.4 Unlike China, India received this development in silence, however, it is clear that the formation of such alliances counters India’s interests.5 Japan welcomed the creation of AUKUS, especially in terms of “increased engagement in the Indo-Pacific”.6 As a result of the formation of the partnership, a military contract was terminated between Australia and France, which left the latter understandably dissatisfied. The EU also almost unanimously provided a negative assessment to the foundation of AUKUS,7 which gives us reasons to suspect that there is more to EU’s dissatisfaction than a mere termination of a single military contact. Russia initially acted reservedly, opting for a position of an observer.8
The article discusses the potential benefits for AUKUS members, impacts of the alliance on the global arena, as well as possible expansion of the partnership. Simultaneously, it is a subject of debate, whether the post-WWII modus operandi of military alliances is about to change due to the precedent of AUKUS; What role the establishment of minilateralist alliances has to play in the new trends of global politics and to what degree it provides an additional tool for Georgia in terms of ensuring security.
The US has intended to expand its influence in the Indo-pacific for a considerable amount of time. For these purposes, Washington had actively sought allies in the region.9 It is important for the US to respond to the chaos caused by the unflattering withdrawal of allied forces from Afghanistan, thus, clearing any doubts regarding the reliability of its allies. The establishment of AUKUS underscores two issues: 1) the US will not abandon its allies in need, and 2) the US wants to balance the rising Chinese power in the Indo-Pacific.10
Australia and the US share a special partnership. In fact, Australia is often considered one of the most loyal allies of Washington, which is confirmed by the fact that Australia has participated in every single US war since 1917.11 Therefore, when it comes to solidifying US influence in the Indo-Pacific, Australia is a first-choice option.
The main driving force of AUKUS is the US, however, geographically speaking, Australia is the most significant asset within the partnership. This is confirmed by the decision of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jean-Yves Le Drian, to recall French Ambassadors from both Washington and Canberra, but not London.12
It is clear what Australia stands to benefit from this new alliance: a fleet of the most modern, nuclear submarines (French contract was for diesel submarines); knowledge and technology-sharing with the US and the UK in terms of cybersecurity, AI, and quantum technologies, etc.13 It is noteworthy that by signing a military contract with France, a politically neutral power in the Indo-Pacific, Australia weakened its geopolitical position, which provided China with the opportunity to increase political pressure on Canbera.14 Nevertheless, now Australia began transforming into an active regional player.
Participation in such alliances is also beneficial for the UK, especially in terms of the implementation of the Global Britain concept.15 Quickly overcoming difficulties associated with Brexit and maintaining the UK’s advantageous position are the key interests of Her Majesty’s Government. The UK, now more than ever, requires new markets and profitable, long-term contracts. In fact, it is very likely that the terminated 56-billion contract between Australia and France will be picked up by British manufacturers.16
The formation of AUKUS is a timely and beneficial initiative for all three members, both in terms of geopolitics and economics.
Due to the fact that the Indo-Pacific acts as a cross-point for the interests of various power-centers, the formation of AUKUS bears both regional and global significance.
The formation of AUKUS, quickly dubbed as the NATO of the Indo-Pacific,17 initially resulted in a frenzy, as it might have resulted in confrontation among Western Allies. All EU members immediately supported France.18 EU leaders came out openly against the partnership: the President of the European Commission, Ursula Von Der Leyen called such mistreatment of France “unacceptable”, with the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, condemning the US for the lack of loyalty and transparency. The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, also made a statement describing the formation of AUKUS as a ‘wake-up call’ for Europe. The EU went so far as to begin discussion on the creation of an independent defense force. French opposition called for the country’s withdrawal from NATO.19 Later, after his meeting with his French colleague, President Biden admitted that France was ‘inconvenienced’.20
These developments were mainly due to the secretive nature of the formation of the partnership, which, in turn, was caused by mistrust between Europe and the US over the Chinese issue. The US is not satisfied with individual members of NATO and the EU. For example, Germany and France have a balanced approach towards China – something that Washington finds unacceptable.21
In its attempts to position itself as an influential center of power in the Indo-Pacific, France received a critical hit, as the Delhi-Paris-Canberra axis virtually ceased to exist. As a result, France will have to review its alliances and attract ‘more Europe’ in the Indo-Pacific region, using German and Dutch connections to find new partners in an easier manner.22 France will not waver in its attempts to assume leadership of the EU in the Indo-Pacific in order to counterbalance the Anglosphere.
The formation of AUKUS also initiated a domino effect within NATO itself. France began seeking minilateral alliances, signing a military contract for submarines with Greece. This, naturally, affects another NATO member – Turkey. As a result, increased controversy within NATO is expected.23
The EU, in turn, attempts to be actively represented in the region, which is confirmed by the Indo-Pacific Strategy of the EU published on September 16 of 2021.24 The goal of the strategy is to deepen cooperation with regional powers, including: India, Japan and Taiwan. The EU vowed to strengthen naval diplomacy and attempt to mobilize more naval power of its members in the region.25
For China, this new alliance signals adamant willingness of the US to rival Beijing in the region, softening the edges of Chinese diplomacy towards regional state-actors. China will naturally attempt to use the rough start of AUKUS for its benefit, enticing local countries unenthusiastic of the new US-initiated partnership (Indonesia, Malaysia and New Zealand) to join its course.
Verbal condemnations aside, Russia does not perceive this new partnership as an existential threat, viewing the developments through the prism of strategic planning.27 Even said official statements mostly have to do with the Kremlin’s concerns over the acquisition of a nuclear submarine fleet by the Australians.28 Russia may, in fact, be benefiting from such an alliance, providing Moscow with the opportunity to deepen ties with China and other countries in terms of naval power and economic cooperation, as well as becoming part of new alliances in order to increase its influence in the region.18
Having traditional ties to Britain, India is actively developing cooperation with Western countries, such as the US, Australia and France. India is, simultaneously, a member of QUAD.* Based on this and the fact that India has territorial disputes with China,30 it might opt to join AUKUS and act as a counterbalance for China down the line. It must also be taken into consideration that India is the largest/most populous democracy in the world.31
As a party to QUAD, Japan enjoys fruitful relations with all members of the organization. Thus, it is of a vital interest for Tokyo to receive membership in an organization like AUKUS. It is not coincidental that Japan is considered as the first candidate for admission in case of expansion.32 As a reliable regional partner for the West, Japan often manages to pursue its own interests in Oceania on the side. Despite the rising interest among Japanese businesses for the Chinese market, strengthening military alliances with the West is considered a top strategic priority for Tokyo.33
However, Indonesia, another significant actor in the wider region, does not share similar views towards AUKUS. The government of Indonesia expressed concern over the potential escalation of tensions in the region over the creation of such new military partnerships.34 Despite signals that Indonesia is, albeit reluctantly, accepting the reality and the coming into force of AUKUS,35 it is highly unlikely that Jakarta will apply for membership any time in the nearest future.
Canada also remains skeptical. A strong partner of the US, and a member of the Five Eyes format, Canada is not an active player in the Indo-Pacific, despite being geographically locked into the region.36 Similarly, Ottawa does not participate in the QUAD and Cold-War-era US-initiated formats, such as ANZUS,** which reconfirms the lack of interest on behalf of Canada to actively, let alone militarily, engage in the region.
According to the UK Chief of the Defense Staff, Nicholas Carter, AUKUS remains open for other countries to join – “this is a first step and we are sure that the partnership will include new members who share our values.”37 Carter obviously meant Japan, New Zealand and Canada. Experts do not exclude the possibility of India, Vietnam, and South Korea also joining AUKUS.38
The popularity of minilateralism is increasing in the XXI century.39 AUKUS is a clear example of minilaterlism in action, along with QUAD. One of the most accurate definitions of said concept is as follows: “informal initiatives aiming to eradicate specific threats in a given time-frame and based on mutual interest.”40
On February 17, 2022 the UK, Poland and Ukraine formed a trilateral cooperation memorandum,41 which is a security pact aiming to strengthen Ukraine’s defense capabilities.42 This pact acts as another clear example of minilateralism, directed towards the eradication of a specific threat. It will be a subject of great interest after the conclusion of the Russo-Ukrainian war whether this partnership will transform into a new alliance focusing on protection of Ukraine from any further military interventions.
Cooperation between Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey in the security sector, including the trilateral defense cooperation memorandum signed in 201843, may also grow into an interesting precedent of minilateralism in the Caucasus region. This will depend on whether the partnership receives appropriate attention, with other NATO members expressing readiness to further solidify the arrangements set up within its framework.
Minilateralist alliances are unexpected for adversaries. They are unpredictable by nature and do not normally apply traditional approaches or consistent actions. Therefore, such partnerships act as tools that are significantly more potent compared to NATO and other conventional alliances.44 With the formation of AUKUS, a new trend is being set for the coming decades, which will be based on minilateralist ties.45 This can be easily explained by collective fatigue experienced over multilateralism.46
For a relatively small state like Georgia, unable to mobilize universal support to join existing military alliances, AUKUS and other similar partnerships with flexible frameworks, offer more opportunities in terms of potential security guarantees.
The difficult security situation of the Post-Soviet Eastern Europe requires solutions. The war in Ukraine reconfirmed that states that are not parties to military alliances represent easy targets for aggressor states, in terms of economic, as well as other types of aggression. In this regard, solutions are already being debated. Ukraine expressed the idea to create the U-24 alliance, which would ensure the cessation of hostilities in the region and help the victims.47
The recent National Defense Strategy of the US focuses on threats emanating from China.48 The events that transpired on February 24th of 2022, dramatically altered the global agenda, which was, naturally, mirrored by the aforementioned document. The first draft of the renewed strategy regards Russia an acute threat.49 US Senators also do not exclude the possibility of Ukraine’s fate to befall upon Georgia and Moldova too.50 As the US expresses willingness and readiness to protect the rules-based international order, including via creating various tools and instruments, minilateralist partnerships can be considered a legitimate path towards a more secure region, along with the opportunity for non-member states to join existing military alliances like NATO. Such a partnership could bring the relationship between the US and non-members of NATO under a framework of institutionalized cooperation, aiming to minimize threats to common security and strengthen defense capabilities of non-member states.
After the conclusion of the Cold War, the economic considerations determined the creation of new alliances. For example, the developments of the 1990-2000s inspired the creation of the Union of South American Nations, a concept that failed completely in recent years. Nevertheless, the military component regains its significance in terms of alliance-formation. With the founding of AUKUS begins an age of alliances in the Indo-Pacific, with all military powers attempting to carve out a niche. Franco-Greek military cooperation is a good example of such developments taking place in Europe. Therefore, as minilateralist connections become increasingly prioritized and such alliances act as additional tools for regional problem solving when it comes to security issues, Georgia is provided with the opportunity to pre-emptively work on finding new paths for ensuring said security.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/16/cold-war-mentality-china-criticises-aukus-us-uk-australia-submarine-pact [5] Madan, Tanvi. 2021. “India, the Quad and AUKUS”. Lawfare, September 24, 2021. https://www.lawfareblog.com/india-quad-and-aukus [6] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2021. “Press Conference by Foreign Minister MOTEGI Toshimitsu”. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/kaiken/kaiken25e_000038.html#topic1. [7] Parker, Jessica. 2021. “Aukus: Defense Pact an Awkward Wake-Up Call for Europe”. BBC News, September 17, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-58600454 [8] Muraviev, Alexey D. 2021. “After AUKUS, Russia Sees a Potential Threat — and an Opportunity to Market Its Own Submarines.” The Conversation, September 23, 2021. https://theconversation.com/after-aukus-russia-sees-a-potential-threat-and-an-opportunity-to-market-its-own-submarines-168374 [9] Hooper, Craig. 2021. “The New ‘Three Amigos’ AUKUS Alliance Sets the Stage for a Pacific NATO.” Forbes, September 19, 2021. https://www.forbes.com/sites/craighooper/2021/09/19/the-new-three-amigos-aukus-alliance-sets-the-stage-for-a-pacific-nato/?sh=74b30fbb71b2. [10] Edel, Charles. 2021. “What Drove the United States to AUKUS? | The Strategist”. The Strategist, November 3, 2021. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/what-drove-the-united-states-to-aukus/. [11] Camroux, David. 2021. “AUKUS: Why Britain Was the Big Winner”. The Diplomat, December 2, 2021. https://thediplomat.com/2021/12/aukus-why-britain-was-the-big-winner/. [12] Kayali, Laura. 2021. “French Officials Dismiss UK as Bit Player in Submarine Spat”. POLITICO, September 19, 2021. https://www.politico.eu/article/france-officials-jean-yves-le-drian-uk-us-australia-military-pact/. [13] Prime Minister of Australia. 2021. “Joint Leaders Statement on AUKUS | Prime Minister of Australia.” https://www.pm.gov.au/media/joint-leaders-statement-aukus. [14] Hooper, Craig. 2021. “The New ‘Three Amigos’ AUKUS Alliance Sets the Stage for a Pacific NATO”. Forbes, September 19. 2021. https://www.forbes.com/sites/craighooper/2021/09/19/the-new-three-amigos-aukus-alliance-sets-the-stage-for-a-pacific-nato/?sh=74b30fbb71b2. [15] GOV. UK. 2021. “Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defense, Development and Foreign Policy.” https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy. [16] Camroux, David. 2021. “AUKUS: Why Britain Was the Big Winner”. The Diplomat, December 2, 2021. https://thediplomat.com/2021/12/aukus-why-britain-was-the-big-winner/. [17] Hooper, Craig. 2021. “The New ‘Three Amigos’ AUKUS Alliance Sets the Stage for a Pacific NATO”. Forbes, September 19, 2021. https://www.forbes.com/sites/craighooper/2021/09/19/the-new-three-amigos-aukus-alliance-sets-the-stage-for-a-pacific-nato/?sh=74b30fbb71b2. [18] Tchakarova, Velina. 2021. Austria and the AUKUS: From the “Island of the Blessed” toward the “Island of the Indifferent”. Institute for Security & Development Policy.
https://isdp.eu/content/uploads/2021/10/AUKUS-Resetting-European-Thinking-on-the-Indo-Pacific-9.11.21.pdf. [19] Pollet, Mathieu. 2021. “French Opposition Reopens NATO Exit Debate after AUKUS Submarine Row”. Euractiv, September 27, 2021. https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/french-opposition-reopens-nato-exit-debate-after-aukus-submarine-row/. [20] Manson, Katrina. 2021. “Biden Acknowledges ‘Clumsy’ Treatment of France in Launch of Aukus Pact”. Financial Times, October 29, 2021. https://www.ft.com/content/3a2b3c77-370c-473e-a5c7-3aaf8c0ce256 [21] Erskine, Andrew. 2021. “NATO, AUKUS & the Indo-Pacific: Further Proof of Intra-Alliance Friction”. NAOC, December 21. 2021. https://natoassociation.ca/nato-aukus-the-indo-pacific-further-proof-of-intra-alliance-friction/. [22] de Hoop Scheffer, Alexandra and Quencez, Martin. 2021. “The New AUKUS Alliance Is Yet Another Transatlantic Crisis for France”. GMFUS, September 17, 2021.
https://www.gmfus.org/news/new-aukus-alliance-yet-another-transatlantic-crisis-france [23] Erskine, Andrew. 2021. “NATO, AUKUS & the Indo-Pacific: Further Proof of Intra-Alliance Friction”. NAOC, December 21. 2021. https://natoassociation.ca/nato-aukus-the-indo-pacific-further-proof-of-intra-alliance-friction/. [24] European Commission. 2021. “The EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific”. Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council. Brussels, September 16, 2021. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/jointcommunication_2021_24_1_en.pdf. [25] Ibid. [26] Wintour, Patrick. 2021. “As China Threat Rises, Can Aukus Alliance Recover from Rancorous Birth?” The Guardian, November 23, 2021. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/23/as-china-threat-rises-can-aukus-alliance-recover-from-rancorous-birth [27] Kortunov, Andrey. 2021. “Should Russia Be Worried by the New AUKUS Alliance?” Carnegie Moscow Center, September 29, 2021. https://carnegiemoscow.org/commentary/85451. [28] Reuters. 2021. “Russia Worried AUKUS Pact Will Allow Australia to Enter Elite Nuclear Submarine Club”. October 1, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-worried-aukus-pact-will-allow-australia-enter-elite-nuclear-submarine-2021-10-01/. [29] Muraviev, Alexey D. 2021. “After AUKUS, Russia Sees a Potential Threat — and an Opportunity to Market Its Own Submarines.” The Conversation, September 23, 2021.
https://theconversation.com/after-aukus-russia-sees-a-potential-threat-and-an-opportunity-to-market-its-own-submarines-168374 [30] Paskal, Cleo. 2021. “Indo-Pacific Strategies, Perceptions and Partnerships.” Chatham House, March 23, 2021. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/03/indo-pacific-strategies-perceptions-and-partnerships [31] European Parliament. 2014. “India: the Biggest Democracy in the World.” https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2014/538956/EPRS_ATA(2014)538956_REV1_EN.pdf [32] Greene, Andrew. 2021. ”United States Pushes Back on New Zealand and Other Allies’ Hopes of Joining AUKUS.” ABC Australia, December 6, 2021. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-12-06/united-states-pushes-back-new-zealand-joining-aukus/100677496 [33] Paskal, Cleo. 2021. “Indo-Pacific Strategies, Perceptions and Partnerships.” Chatham House, March 23, 2021. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/03/indo-pacific-strategies-perceptions-and-partnerships [34] Strangio, Sebastian. 2022. “Indonesia And Malaysia Reiterate Concerns about AUKUS Pact”. The Diplomat, October 19, 2021. https://thediplomat.com/2021/10/indonesia-and-malaysia-reiterate-concerns-about-aukus-pact/. [35] Lamb, Kate. 2021. “Indonesia’s Defense Minister Says ‘Understands, Respects’ AUKUS Pact”. Reuters, November 22, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/indonesias-defence-minister-says-understands-respects-aukus-pact-2021-11-22/. [36] Raaymakers, Steve. 2021. “Why Is Canada Missing from the Indo-Pacific?” The Diplomat, October 25, 2021. https://thediplomat.com/2021/10/why-is-canada-missing-from-the-indo-pacific/. [37] Greene, Andrew. 2021. ”United States Pushes Back on New Zealand and Other Allies’ Hopes of Joining AUKUS.” ABC Australia, December 6, 2021. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-12-06/united-states-pushes-back-new-zealand-joining-aukus/100677496 [38] Kortunov, Andrey. 2021. “Should Russia Be Worried by the New AUKUS Alliance?” Carnegie Moscow Center, September 29, 2021. https://carnegiemoscow.org/commentary/85451. [39] Tirkey, Aarshi. 2021. “Minilaterals and Their Impact on Indo-Pacific Security – The National Security Futures Hub.” National Security College Futures Hub.
https://futureshub.anu.edu.au/minilaterals-and-their-impact-on-indo-pacific-security/. [40] Ibid. [41] GOV.UK. 2022. “United Kingdom, Poland and Ukraine Foreign Ministers’ Joint Statement, February 2022.” https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-statement-by-the-united-kingdom-poland-and-ukraine-17-february-2022#:~:text=The%20UK%20and%20Poland%20will,territorial%20integrity%20within%20its%20internationally. [42] Sprenger, Sebastian. 2022. “Ukraine, UK, Poland Announce Security Pact amid Heightened Tensions”. Defense news, February 18, 2022.
https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/02/17/ukraine-uk-poland-announce-security-pact-amid-heightened-tensions/. [43] Ministry of Defense of Georgia. 2018. „საქართველოს, თურქეთსა და აზერბაიჯანს შორის თავდაცვის სფეროში სტრატეგიული თანამშრომლობა კიდევ უფრო ღრმავდება.“ (“Strategic Cooperation between Georgia, Turkey and Azerbaijan Deepening”)
https://mod.gov.ge/ge/news/read/6451/saqartvelos-turqetsa-da-azerbaijans-shoris-tavdacvis-sferoshi-strategiuli-tanamshromloba-kidev-ufro-grmavdeba. [44] Kortunov, Andrey. 2021. “Should Russia Be Worried by the New AUKUS Alliance?”. Carnegie Moscow Center, September 29, 2021. https://carnegiemoscow.org/commentary/85451. [45] Shoebridge, Michael. 2021. “Why Did AUKUS Happen? Because the World Changed.” ICDS, November 4, 2021. https://icds.ee/en/why-did-aukus-happen-because-the-world-changed/. [46] Naim, Moises. 2009. “Minilateralism”. Foreign Policy.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/06/21/minilateralism/. [47] Tyshchenko, Kateryna. 2022. “Zelenskyy Urges G7 to Set Up U24 Security Guarantee System”. Ukrayinska Pravda. https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/03/24/7334237/. [48] Donnelly, John. 2022. “Russian Threat Is Forcing a Rewrite of US Defense Plans.” Roll Call, February 25. 2021. https://rollcall.com/2022/02/25/russian-threat-is-forcing-a-rewrite-of-u-s-defense-plans/. [49] Detsch, Jack. 2022. “Pentagon Rolls out Defense Strategy amid War in Europe”. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/28/pentagon-defense-strategy-russia-ukraine-war/. [50] Donnelly, John. 2022. “Russian Threat Is Forcing a Rewrite of US Defense Plans.” Roll Call, February 25. 2021. https://rollcall.com/2022/02/25/russian-threat-is-forcing-a-rewrite-of-u-s-defense-plans/
Notes:
* Quadrilateral security dialogue between the US, Australia, India and Japan;
** A military alliance between the US, Australia, and New Zealand.
* Imedi (Ivi) Alshibaia – Thind Secretary, Department of Strategic Communications, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia
Contents
Peaceful Neighbourhood -Georgia’s Role and Vision
Lasha Darsalia
Russias Revisionist View Regarding the European Security Architecture Causes of the Crisis and the Goals of the Kremlin
Ana Chitaladze
EU-China Rivalry and Sanction Policy
Davit Pipinashvili
New Enlargement Policy – The EU’s Renaissance
Lika Chipashvili
Military Alliance of the US, UK, and Australia (AUKUS) Minilateralism and Georgia’s
Imedi (Ivi) Alshibaia