Future of the Eastern Partnership and the New Prospects of the EU-Georgian Relations
Abstract
The article examines paths of development of the Eastern Partnership Initiative, outcomes achieved during the thirteen years of its existence and the EU-Georgian relations in general. The article also touches upon the outcomes of the December 15 Summit (2021), as well as the challenges and future prospects of the Eastern Partnership Initiative. Considering the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia, the paper discusses the significance and potential outcomes of Georgia’s submission of the application of accession into the EU.
Baia Kapanadze
After regaining independence, Georgia’s relations with the EU have been characterized by positive dynamism. Bilateral relations were established rather quickly; the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) was signed in 1996 and, in 2004, Georgia became involved in the European Neighbourhood Policy. EU’s neighbourhood policy aims to support the intensification of connectivity among its neighbours in terms of political, economic and cultural dimensions.1
The elevation of EU-Georgian cooperation to a new level was determined by regional developments including the establishment of the Union for the Mediterranean and the Russo-Georgian War of 2008, which necessitated active engagement of the EU in order to maintain stability and spread democratic values. As a result, the Eastern Partnership Initiative was established in 2009, which aimed to ensure stability and security, as well as democracy and prosperity, along EU’s eastern borders, by means of conducting and implementing a plethora of bilateral and multilateral projects.2
Although Georgia’s participation in said initiative was not overtly considered as a tool/component for accession, the process of political and economic integration propelled by the Eastern Partnership Initiative helped Georgia to harmonize with EU standards. In turn, fruitful reforms undertaken in this regard helped Georgia to achieve the status of an associated state, which acted as the foundation for the planned submission of the application for accession into the organization in 2024. Regardless, Russian-perpetrated aggression against Ukraine forced the Georgian party to speed up the process, submitting the application on March 3, 2022.
In order to describe the course of development of the Eastern Partnership, firstly, the article focuses on the significance and goals of the Initiative. Next, discussing the outcomes and expectations thirteen years after the establishment of the partnership, the paper analyzes the issues on the agenda of its most recent summit, along with the future format of the platform, including in terms of the ongoing geopolitical shifts.
After the 2004 round of enlargement, the EU set out to establish closer cooperation and connections with its Southern and Eastern neighbours, via formulating a European Neighbourhood Policy.3The Eastern Partnership, acting as the framework of EU’s relations with its eastern neighbourhood, was formed to include 6 Eastern European states (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine), entailing cooperation within both bilateral and multilateral formats.
The goal of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) is to deepen cooperation across the following four dimensions: 1. Democracy, Good Governance and Stability; 2. Economic Integration and Policy Harmonization; 3. Energy Security; 4. People to People Contacts.4There are six flagship initiatives, aiming to provide additional stimulus and specific input/essence to EaP, that act as important components of EaP’s multilateral cooperation framework. Said flagship initiatives help gather financial aid from various international financial institutions, as well as the private sector. The flagship initiatives of the EaP include mechanisms of support for small and medium-scale businesses, seeking alternative routes for energy, and environmental protection.5
It is noteworthy that several EaP members managed to deepen bilateral relations with the EU prior to the enactment of the aforementioned initiative. Therefore, both processes of political association and economic integration kicked off in a comparatively rapid manner. Georgia and Moldova signed Association Agreements in 2014. Despite the reluctance of the Yanukovych administration coming under pressure from the Kremlin, Ukraine’s new government followed suit later that year and signed the Association Agreement with the EU after the annexation of Crimea by Russia and public protests in Ukraine. As a result, the official process of association for the three countries under question was completed in 2016.6
However, cooperation with the other three partners turned out to be more difficult. In this regard, Russia’s geopolitical interests and influence on the region are also of note. Armenia refused to sign the association agreement with the EU, joining the rivalling Eurasian Economic Union. The Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement” (not including the DCFTA) was signed in March 2021, after 3 years of deliberation.7 Talks have also begun with Azerbaijan in 2017, in order to replace the 1999 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.8 The worsening of EU-Belarus relations are also noteworthy, resulting in the termination of partnership with Belarus on June 28th of 2021.9
As a multifaceted tool, the EaP has brought tangible outcomes for the associated states, which provided additional stimulus for the formation of the ‘Associated Trio’.10As a result of the 2021 summit, the presidents of the three states signed a joint declaration, calling on the EU to recognize the future perspective of said countries in terms of ultimate accession into the organization.
The main factor determining the differentiated approach on behalf of the EU when it comes to partner states concerns effective implementation of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI). This can be broken down into the implementation of internal reforms across priority dimensions outlined in the ENP action plans, as well as having a declared position in support of European integration. Since 2016, members of the ‘Associated Trio’ have actively introduced aforementioned reforms, which is displayed in the annual reports on the implementation of the action plan of the Association Agreement.11 In terms of European integration, this places them in a relatively favorable position compared to other partners. The Eastern Partnership Index for 2020-2021, published by the civil forum is also noteworthy, as it outlines and assesses the degree of harmonization with EU normative and legal frameworks. According to said document, granting candidacy to the ‘Trio’ will further boost the development of market economy, democracy and the rule of law.12
Based on wide-scale and comprehensive consultations held by the European Commission in 2019 and 2020 it can be argued that the EaP has brought about tangible and positive results for the partner-states, as well as the EU.13Achievements of the ‘Trio’ (Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova) are also noteworthy, along with their aspirations. In terms of economic integration, the EU has become the largest trading partner for all three aforementioned states,14 which creates further challenges for Russia, as the Kremlin holds strategic interests in the region. In terms of education, the Erasmus+ student exchange program is also successfully operating, with more than 43,000 individuals participating since 2015.15 Economic and educational ties have also been strengthened with the other EaP members.16
The support from the EU for projects aiming to increase public engagement is also noteworthy. Another important aspect concerns people-to-people relations and the simplification of travel regimes. The introduction of the visa-free regime has encouraged citizens of the partner-states to travel freely, with non-members receiving the opportunity to receive visas through simplified procedures. Associated states have made changes across various priority dimensions, such as agriculture, labor safety, combatting corruption; however, the implementation of painful reforms also causes high levels of emigration to developed countries, unemployment and political unrest.17
In order to eradicate said problematic issues, the EU has already initiated a large-scale, two-prong plan, which outlines the universally beneficial priorities for the entire region. The first dimension concerns the reform plan, 20 Result for 2020, voiced and adopted during the EaP summit in 2017,18which has already proved to be rather fruitful in terms of the economy, governance, connectivity, and public affairs. Nevertheless, many problems remain to be solved, especially when it comes to the rule of law, the civil society, media freedom, and gender equality.19
Simultaneously, a plan has been developed for the post-Pandemic period – “Reconstruction, Resilience and Reforms 2020 and Beyond”- which is founded on the Working Document published by the EU in July of 2021 and outlines the two vectors of cooperation with partners: governance and investment. Additionally, climate change mitigation and environmental protection remain the key priority areas.20, EU’s attitude towards the EaP as a particularly successful initiative, “having met expectations as an efficiency-oriented project”, is also noteworthy.21 Leaders of the member-states have emphasized the importance of further steps that need to be taken for the attainment of the following goals: solidifying attained achievements, development of social and economic sustainability among partner states, implementation of educational programs focusing on tackling hybrid threats and misinformation, as well as additional benefits that can be brought on the ‘more for more’ basis for the comparatively ambitious partners, binding them via conditionality and stimulation.22
The principle of differentiated approach is of great significance for Georgia, as a tailored approach from the EU brings about more opportunities, due to the fact that integratory processes can be undertaken independently both in terms of the time-frame and quality.23 Georgia is outlined as a leading country in the region at high level meetings, as well as in reports of the EaP, with appropriate expectations towards the aspiring country to continue its efforts in the future, retaining the title.24 This is determined by the dynamism, gradual and thorough implementation of the association agenda on behalf of Georgia. Furthermore, membership of the energy commonwealth, special formats focusing on the security dialogue, as well as high-level dialogue with the EU, confirm and solidify Georgia’s leading position even more.25
Retaining the leading status is one of the most significant priorities for Georgia. Therefore, the Georgian government has already incorporated key priorities in this regard into the national plan.26 Dimensions where EU-Georgian cooperation resulted in tangible outcomes were also outlined: the attainment of the visa-free travel regime, participation in the Erasmus+ educational program, Horizon 2020, the European School, increased trade between Georgia and the EU, energy and infrastructure projects.27
According to the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, David Zalkaliani, the EaP has considerably aided Georgia in the process of transformation and reformation, helping in terms of further political association and economic integration with the EU. He goes on to note that Georgia is currently a close partner for the EU. This is precisely why Georgia feels ambitious enough to apply for accession in 2024.28 Nevertheless, considering regional developments, namely Russia’s invasion of Ukraine launched on the 24th of February of 2022, Georgia, along with the other two members of the ‘Associated Trio’, opted to accelerate the process, submitting said applications on the 3rd of March of 2022.
Within the framework of the EaP, in terms of the implementation of the obligations outlined in the Association Agreement, the scope of challenging sectors for Georgia is as follows: transportation, environmental protection and insurance. Reforming said sectors requires large financial assets and is rather unpopular in the short-term.30 Thus, the hindered implementation of reforms across the aforementioned dimensions creates the risk of loss of the status of a leading country within the EaP framework, which, in turn, may result in the slashing of financial aid, mirroring the ‘more for more’ principle with the ‘less for less’ approach.31In this regard, it is necessary to hold continuous communication with the EU providing Brussels with appropriate argumentation.
The premature submitting of the application for accession into the EU reconfirms the significance of the continuation of efficient implementation of the agenda of the Association Agreement. Regardless of the decision reached by the European Commission concerning Georgia’s candidacy (whether Georgia receives the status of a candidate state or the European Perspective), the Association Agreement will remain a crucial tool for the determining of the progress made by Georgia along the path towards European integration.
The five EaP members formulated a joint political declaration during the EaP summit held on December 15, 2021. The declaration outlines EU’s support for the development and attainment of prosperity, peace, stability, as well as sustainability and resilience in the region. Moreover, considering the principles of differentiation and inclusivity, support towards the initiative of the ‘Trio’ regarding the “deepening of cooperation with the EU” was underscored.32The 6th summit of the EaP also emphasized the existing situation for the ‘Trio’. The EU noted the significance of entry into force of the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement signed between the EU and Armenia in March of 2021, as well as the progress made within the framework of the ongoing negotiations with Azerbaijan to sign a similar agreement. Regret was expressed over the withdrawal of Belarus from the project.33An ambitious agenda has been outlined within the framework of the aforementioned declaration. Its aim is to support reforms across the following dimensions: energy security, judiciary, strategic communications, healthcare, environmental protection and digital transformation.34
The specific initiatives of the declaration voiced during the recent summit elucidates the unified position of the EU regarding the future of the EaP. Despite the attempts of the ‘Associated Trio’ to receive a differentiated approach, the EaP, thus, remains a central tool within the framework of EU’s neighbourhood policy.
Despite the fact that the EaP initiative resulted in tangible progress for its members across dimensions like the economy, people-to-people relations and political integration, the partner states still face significant challenges in terms of good governance35 and unresolved military conflicts. The existing challenges faced by the associated states make it impossible for occupied regions to receive the benefits gained from European integration and institutional development36. Political differences between Armenia and Azerbaijan resurfaced due to the Second Karabakh War (2020), which also resulted in a shifting geopolitical picture; Russia’s war in Ukraine, and the roping in of Belarus in said conflict, makes the multilateral cooperation among the EaP members more difficult.
Thirteen years after its founding, the EaP initiative has entered the pivotal stage of its existence. On the one hand, economic, people-to-people, and political contacts, continue to grow between the EU and its partners, however, on the other hand, said partners do not see the process of European integration in an identical manner. After signing the Association Agreement, Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova have reached a level of cooperation with the EU that far exceeds similar ties with Azerbaijan, Armenia, and especially, Belarus. Despite the aforementioned differences, the EU continues its undifferentiated policy towards all six members of the EaP. The EU bases its policy on the willingness of its partners to continue cooperation. The recent geopolitical developments in the region, however (withdrawal from the program by Belarus, the 2020 Second Karabakh War, and Russia’s invasion into Ukraine), illustrated the challenges faced by the Eastern Partnership Initiative.
In order for the EaP to remain a potent tool for regional cooperation in EU’s neighbourhood, Brussels needs to adopt a more ambitious model of foreign policy, which would focus on geostrategic goals, reviewing and renewing the EaP, thus, strengthening both the program and the principle of ‘more for more’.
It is noteworthy that prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, there was no clear consensus on granting the ‘Associated Trio’ with the European perspective. Nevertheless, the Russian aggression perpetrated against Ukraine, resulting in the early submission of the applications for accession by Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, may help to form a consensus among the European leadership on this issue. Thereby, the response of the EU will largely determine the future of the Eastern Partnership Initiative.
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2021/698858/EPRS_IDA(2021)698858_EN.pdf [15] European Commission. 2022. “EU-Eastern Partnership cooperation through Erasmus+.”
https://ec.europa.eu/assets/eac/erasmus-plus/factsheets/regional/easternpartnership-regional-erasmusplus-2020.pdf [16] euneighbours. 2019. “Top 10 Achievements of the Eastern Partnership in the last 10 years.” https://www.euneighbours.eu/sites/default/files/publications/2019-05/Factsheet_EAP_10Years_2019_EN_0.pdf [17] Mirel, Pierre. 2021. “The Eastern Partnership: Between Resilience and Interference”. European Issues No. 589. Foundation Robert Schuman. https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/doc/questions-d-europe/qe-589-en.pdf [18] European Commission. 2021. “20 Deliverables For 2020: Bringing Tangible Results for Citizens.” https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/system/files/202111/112021_eap_deliverables_factsheet_2021_eng.pdf [19] European Commission. 2021. “Q/A: The Eastern Partnership post 2020 priorities.” July 2, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/QANDA_21_3381 [20] European Commission. 2021. „Recovery, Resilience and Reform: Post 2020 Eastern Partnership Priorities.” https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/swd_2021_186_f1_joint_staff_working_paper_en_v2_p1_1356457_0.pdf [21] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia. 2019. „აღმოსავლეთ პარტნიორობა“ უაღრესად წარმატებული პროექტია და ის ევროკავშირის დღის წესრიგში ერთ-ერთ მთავარ პრიორიტეტულ საკითხად დარჩება -ააღ მარგოტ ვალსტრომი.“ https://mfa.gov.ge/News/agmosavlet-partnioroba-uagresad-carmatebuli-proeqt.aspx [22] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia. 2019. „ჩეხეთის საგარეო საქმეთა მინისტრის განცხადებით პარტნიორ ქვეყნებს უფრო ამბიციური პერსპექტივები უნდა შესთავაზონ.“ https://mfa.gov.ge/News/chekhetis-sagareo-saqmeta-ministris-ganckhadebit-p.aspx [23] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia. 2021. საქართველოს ევროკავშირში ინტეგრაციის საგზაო რუკა. Ebook. First ed. თბილისი [24] Blockmans, Steven. 2018. “Georgia’s European Way: What’s Next?” Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum. https://eap-csf.eu/georgias-european-way-whats-next/ [25]European Commission. 2021. “2021 Association Implementation Report in Georgia.” 2021. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2021_association_implementation_report_in_georgia.pdf [26] The Government of Georgia. 2020. „სამთავრობო პროგრამა 2021-2024: „ევროპული სახელმწიფოს მშენებლობისთვის“. http://gov.ge/files/68_78117_645287_govprogramme2021-2024.pdf [27] The Government of Georgia. 2019. „სამთავრობო პროგრამა 2019-2020.“ https://bit.ly/3IMXSa3; The Council of the European Union and the European Council. 2020. “Facts and Figures About EU-Georgia Relations. 2020.” https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/44400/685-annex-5-d-georgia-factsheet.pdf [28] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia. 2019. „ბათუმის კონფერენციის ფარგლებში „აღმოსავლეთ პარტნიორობის“ პერსპექტივებზე სესიის „სიცოცხლე ასოცირების შემდეგ: უფრო მაღალი მიზნის ძიებაში“ იმსჯელეს.“ https://mfa.gov.ge/News/batumis-konferenciis-farglebshi-agmosavlet-partnio.aspx [29] The Government of Georgia. 2022. „ირაკლი ღარიბაშვილმა საქართველოს ევროკავშირში გაწევრიანების განაცხადს ხელი მოაწერა.“
https://www.gov.ge/print.php?gg=1&sec_id=573&info_id=81400&lang_id=GEO [30] The Government of Georgia. 2020. „სამთავრობო პროგრამა 2021-2024: „ევროპული სახელმწიფოს მშენებლობისთვის“. http://gov.ge/files/68_78117_645287_govprogramme2021-2024.pdf [31] European Commission. 2021. “Eastern Partnership Summit – Joint Declaration.” December 15, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/news/eastern-partnership-summit-joint-declaration-2021-12-15_en [32] Ibid.[33] Ibid.[34] Ibid.[35] Przetacznik, Jakub and Russell, Martin. 2021. “Eastern Partnership post-2020 agenda.” EPRS European Parliamentary Research Service, pp.1-30.
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2021/698858/EPRS_IDA(2021)698858_EN.pdf[36] Mirel, Pierre. 2021. “The Eastern Partnership: Between Resilience and Interference”. European Issues No. 589. Foundation Robert Schuman. https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/doc/questions-d-europe/qe-589-en.pdf
* Baia Kapanadze – Third Secretary, EU Assistance Coordination and Sectoral Integration Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia
Contents
Peaceful Neighbourhood -Georgia’s Role and Vision
Lasha Darsalia
Russias Revisionist View Regarding the European Security Architecture Causes of the Crisis and the Goals of the Kremlin
Ana Chitaladze
EU-China Rivalry and Sanction Policy
Davit Pipinashvili
New Enlargement Policy – The EU’s Renaissance
Lika Chipashvili
Military Alliance of the US, UK, and Australia (AUKUS) Minilateralism and Georgia’s
Imedi (Ivi) Alshibaia