Europe in Search of Strategic Autonomy against the Backdrop of a Shifting Security Environment
Abstract
Against the backdrop of the Russo-Ukrainian War and the intensifying Sino-US confrontation, in a world full of growing global challenges, the idea of “European Strategic Autonomy” is increasingly gaining traction as the only political model able to save the European project. The goal of the article is to analyse the vision of “European Strategic Autonomy”. The paper discusses the essence of “European Strategic Autonomy/Sovereignty”, the factors determining the current necessity of achieving the aforementioned idea; as well as the primary challenges that Europe encounters in the process of securing its sovereignty.
Lika Tchipashvili
In the current geopolitical context, the need for Europe to demonstrate itself as a powerful foreign policy actor is more urgent than ever. Ensuring “Europe’s Strategic Autonomy/Sovereignty” is argued to be the mainc basis for this.
The article aims to provide an overview of the idea of “European Strategic Autonomy/Sovereignty”: What does the concept mean? What factors underpin the necessity to ensure its realization today? Particularly, what dimensions and challenges emerge along the path toward ensuring a more united, sovereign, and democratic Europe?
First, it is important to note that there is no mention of “European Strategic Autonomy” in the founding treaties of the EU. The term was first used within a military context in the 1994 “White Book” about National Defence of the French Republic.1 It touches upon the expected risks potentially faced by French defence forces due to the exclusive reliance of Paris on NATO security guarantees. Later in 1998, the term was used at the European continental level in a joint Franco-British declaration2, which stated that EU member states must retain their obligations within the framework of the organization, while simultaneously developing the EU’s “ability to act autonomously” mostly in terms of managing international crises. “Europe requires stronger armed forces able to deal with new risks built on a strong, competitive military-technological basis”, – reads the declaration, the anima of which was used as the basis in the process of formulating the European Defence and Security Policy.
The next mention of the term came in the form of the Conclusions of the European Council, adopted on December 19-20, 2013, which went beyond global crises and focused on the need to ensure European security. It reads: “Europe needs a more integrated, sustainable, innovative and competitive defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB) to develop and sustain defence capabilities. This can also enhance its strategic autonomy and its ability to act with partners..”3
The need to achieve Strategic Autonomy was emphasized in the EU’s 2016 Global Strategy,4 which also expanded its scope: “An appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy is important for Europe’s ability to promote peace and security within and beyond its borders. We will therefore enhance our efforts on defence, cybersecurity, counterterrorism, energy and strategic communications.”5
Since 2017, the President of the French Republic, Emmanuel Macron, has actively lobbied the idea of a “more united, sovereign and democratic Europe” across six key dimensions: security; migration; Africa and the Mediterranean; sustainable development; innovation and the digital world; EU’s economic and monetary policy.6 Furthermore, the French president considers European Strategic Autonomy an integral part of France’s national security, emphasizing the distinguished role of France as a “balancing state” – the only state in the EU that is simultaneously a member of NATO and the UNSC. “France’s primary objective in the assessment of the existing situation concerns the integration of views of Europeans, who, strategically speaking, all have different cultures and political priorities”, – states the 2022 French National Strategic Assessment, according to which France will work toward building up long-term compatibility between the EU and NATO, as well as strengthening EU’s defence cooperation with states in the Indo-Pacific region, the US, the UK, etc.7
Completely new dimensions of achieveing European Strategic Autonomy are also emerging: Due to the outcomes of the COVID-19 pandemic, the issue of ensuring strategic autonomy in the healthcare sector has come to the forefront of the European agenda. Moreover, as the result of the Russo-Ukrainian War, Europe faces the need to increase its strategic autonomy in terms of energy-independence from Russia. Additionally, against the backdrop of Sino-U.S. domination in the field of technology, achieving strategic autonomy in the digital domain gains equal significance for the EU.
This is precisely why the EU’s current mission is to ensure its autonomy across several strategic dimensions with a long-term perspective by the year 2050.9 According to the 2021 Concept Paper of the European Commission titled The EU’s Capacity and Freedom to Act, ten specific sectors that fall within the aforementioned framework were identified, including: healthcare; energy; data management; artificial intelligence and related latest tech; critical commodities for primary consumption; defence and security enhancement; access to space, and supporting security and peace globally by means of interstate cooperation.
Therefore, the idea of European Strategic Autonomy, gaining wider political significance, is no longer limited to the defence and security sectors. Moreover, it can be viewed as a foundational idea for the EU as a political community.
As noted above, there are no references to European Strategic Autonomy/Sovereignty in the founding treaties of the EU, and this is not incidental. The founding of the EU, originally established as European Economic Community, represented an attempt on behalf of European states to ensure peace and prosperity on the continent, integrating member states economically rather than politically. The positioning of the EU on the international arena was primarily driven by the advancement of its economic interests rather than its role as a geopolitical actor. Nevertheless, the recent geopolitical shifts make it increasingly evident that if the EU wants to ensure security and prosperity of its citizens, it needs to transform itself from a mere economic bloc into an actual political unity.
“You were given the choice between war and dishonour. You chose dishonour, and you will have war”, – it was precisely with the utterance of these words that Winston Churchill foreshadowed the start of WWII in 1938, when he spoke out against the Franco-British policy of appeasement toward Nazi Germany.10
The EU’s current inability to safeguard peace and security on the continent and avoid a full-scale Russian invasion into Ukraine can also be attributed to a similar policy of appeasement. This is particularly evident, since Vladimir Putin made his expansionist policies known as far back as 2007 at the Munich Security Conference.11 The Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 and the occupation of 20% of its sovereign territory were direct outcomes of the aforementioned Russian policy. Later in 2014, Russia attacked and annexed the Crimea. Concurrently, Moscow continues to demonstrate active support for Moldova’s breakaway region, Transnistria. Russia employs methods of hybrid warfare, directly interfering in the electoral processes of EU member states and supporting nationalist-populist movements across the continent. The Kremlin propaganda makes a point of accentuating the colonial past of European states, portraying them in a negative light. Most recently, Russia has launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This is a rather logical outcome of the fifteen years of appeasement practiced by European states toward Russia. Europe’s response is, therefore, not adequate to the revisionist policies of the Russian Federation. “The annexation of Crimea didn’t manage to wake us up. This was a strategic and political mistake, which we are currently attempting to correct”, – stated Josep Borrell, the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security policy.12
Despite the fact that the EU’s closest strategic ally, the U.S. still perceives Russia as a geopolitical rival, the People’s Republic of China is currently considered as the primary competitor for the United States. According to the latest National Security Strategy of the U.S.:
“Russia and the PRC pose different challenges. Russia poses an immediate threat to the free and open international system, recklessly flouting the basic laws of the international order today, as its brutal war of aggression against Ukraine has shown. The PRC, by contrast, is the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to advance that objective.”13
The Sino-U.S. rivalry increasingly highlights the necessity for the EU to conduct its own foreign policy with regard to China, as, unlike the U.S., Europe does not perceive China as a primary competitor. Europeans simultaneously view China as both a systemic rival and a competitor, as well as a partner14 in areas of cooperation such as climate change, the Iran Nuclear Programme, etc.
Against the backdrop of the global regress of democracy, as well as increased systemic and ideological competition, it is no less important for the EU to continue fighting to protect the democratic model of governance within the framework of strategic autonomy. Despite the fact that a significant majority of the world’s states voted in support of Ukraine during the UN General Assembly (141 countries in favour), it’s important to note that Russian aggression was not condemned by countries with a total population that accounts for half of all humanity (35 countries abstained).15 It is noteworthy that the countries of the Global South still view states that support Ukraine as colonial in nature. Considering this, the Russian propaganda in Africa also poses a threat to the EU, as it directly undermines the democratic model of governance.
In terms of difficulty, achieving strategic autonomy in the realm of defence and security appears to be associated with the greatest complications. Despite a number of steps forward, including the adoption of the 2022 Strategic Compass17 – a mechanism for supporting the development of the common European security culture, along with increased military expenditure, not all EU member states are ready to disregard and/or substitute transatlantic partnership as the primary guarantee of European security. Nordic and Eastern European states are of particular interest in this regard, as for them NATO is of vital significance as a real, trustworthy guarantor of security on the European continent. The so called “Atlanticists” go as far as to consider the idea of strategic autonomy an “illusion”. Neutral EU members are also to be taken into consideration (Austria, Ireland). It is also noteworthy that deeper integration in the defence sector is hindered by the introduction of the qualified majority rule for decision-making.18
Simultaneously, the ambiguity of U.S. domestic policy represents another challenge for the EU; the irreversibility of U.S. loyalty to the principle of multilateralism could become questionable in the future, especially if the next U.S. administration adopts a primarily unilateral vision.
Generally speaking, Franco-German unity within the framework of the EU also represents a significant factor in the process of achieving “strategic autonomy”. As of today, alignment of Franco-German positions regarding a number of issues remains essential. Meanwhile, this last point is ambiguous concerning the future of Europe’s “strategic autonomy”.19 Unlike the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany is not considering the process of achieving strategic autonomy independently from the U.S., which remains a key partner for Europe in this process according to German perspective. This can be explained by the historical context and the special approach of Germans toward the US, which is determined by the positive role the US played in the reunification of divided Germany – one of the most significant national victories for Germans up to now.
Due to Russia’s ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine, the center of gravity in European politics has shifted to the eastern part of the EU. the European Political Community (EPC) was established through an EU initiative, encompassing 44 member states.21 Thus, the EU has assumed political responsibility for the future peace and security of the continent. The EU’s perceptions of geography, borders, enlargement and its neighbourhood policies have also changed. According to the President of the European Commission, Ursula Von Der Leyen, the EU is not complete without Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova.22 “We make Georgia ready for EU membership,” – stated Olivér Várhelyi, the European Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement.23
It is essential that Georgia, as an integral part of the European family of nations, enhances its involvement in the process of achieving European Strategic Autonomy, including by contributing to the development of sectors of critical importance as outlined by the European Commission. This ultimately echoes the statement of the German Chancellor, Olaf Scholz: “As Russia seeks to redraw the boundaries between freedom and autocracy, “we are the people of Europe”, our voice must resound throughout Europe, from the Mediterranean to the North Sea, from Lisbon to Tbilisi and beyond.”24
Mauro, F. 2021. « L’autonomie stratégique, cet obscur objet du désir. » IRIS. Octobre 2021. https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Analyse-13-Autonomie-strate%CC%81gique-obscur-objet-du-de%CC%81sir-FR-Octobre-2021.pdf [5] Berès, P. 2021. « La souveraineté européenne : un concept au cour des débats dans l’union européenne. » 1 mars 2021. https://www.jean-jaures.org/publication/la-souverainete-europeenne-un-concept-au-coeur-des-debats-dans-lunion-europeenne/?post_id=16710&export_pdf=1 [6] Elysee. 2017. « Initiative pour l’Europe – Discours d’Emmanuel Macron pour une Europe souveraine, unie, démocratique. » 26 septembre 2017. https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2017/09/26/initiative-pour-l-europe-discours-d-emmanuel-macron-pour-une-europe-souveraine-unie-democratique [7] Vie-publique. 2022. « Revue nationale stratégique 2022. » https://www.vie-publique.fr/sites/default/files/rapport/pdf/287163.pdf [8] Lamy, P. 2021. « Définir la souveraineté européenne, une conversation avec Pascal Lamy. » Groupe d’études géopolitiques, Décembre 2021. https://geopolitique.eu/articles/definir-la-souverainete-europeenne-une-conversation-avec-pascal-lamy/ [9] European Commission. 2021. “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council 2021 Strategic Foresight Report: The EU’s capacity and freedom to act.” September 8, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/foresight_report_com750_en.pdf [10] Military History. 2010. “Winston Churchill Quotes.” November 20, 2010. https://www.military-history.org/feature/winston-churchill-quotes.htm [11] President of Russia. 2007. “Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy.” February 10, 2007. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034 [12] Alemanno, A et Mouyal, A. 2022. « La doctrine Borrell », une conversation avec le Haut représentant. » Groupe d’études géopolitiques, Oct 2022. https://geopolitique.eu/2022/10/31/une-conversation-avec-josep-borrell/ [13] The White House. 2022. “The National Security Strategy.” October, 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf [14] EEAS. 2022. “EU-China Relations factsheet.” April 1, 2022. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-china-relations-factsheet_en [15] United Nations Digital Library. 2022. “Aggression against Ukraine: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly.” March 2, 2022. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3959039?ln=en [16] European Commission. 2021. “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council 2021 Strategic Foresight Report: The EU’s capacity and freedom to act.” September 8, 2021. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52021DC0750&from=EN;
Leonard, M et Shapiro, J. 2021. « Les cinq défis de la souveraineté européenne. » « Europe : quelle souveraineté ? » Diplomatie n°111, Septembre-Octobre 2021. https://www.areion24.news/produit/diplomatie-n-111/; Dupre, B. 2022. « Souveraineté européenne, autonomie stratégique, Europe puissance : quelle réalité pour l’Union européenne et pour quel avenir ? » Foundation Robert Schuman. Question d’Europe, n°620, 24 Janvier 2022, https://www.robert-schuman.eu/fr/doc/questions-d-europe/qe-620-fr.pdf [17] EEAS. 2022. “A Strategic Compass for the EU.” https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en [18] European Parliamentary Research Service. 2021. “The pros and cons of QMV in foreign and security policy.” January 20, 2021. https://epthinktank.eu/2021/01/20/qualified-majority-voting-in-foreign-and-security-policy-pros-and-cons/the-pros-and-cons-of-qmv-in-foreign-and-security-policy/ [19] Soutou, G.H. 2022. « L’autonomie stratégique européenne », l’Allemagne et la France. DSI N° 158L, Mars-Avril 2022 ; Krpata, M. « Face au durcissement géopolitique, la France et l’Allemagne fixent le cap pour une Union européenne plus résiliente et ambitieuse sur le plan économique », La Revue Diplomatique, n° 19, octobre 2022 https://www.ifri.org/fr/publications/publications-ifri/articles-ifri/face-durcissement-geopolitique-france-lallemagne-fixent [20] European Council/Council of the European Union. 2022. “Informal meeting of the Heads of State or Government. Versailles Declaration, 10 and 11 March 2022.” March 11, 2022. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/54773/20220311-versailles-declaration-en.pdf [21] Laurence, B. 2022. „Europe as a power-space.“ Groupe d’études géopolitiques, November 21, 2022, https://geopolitique.eu/en/2022/11/21/europe-as-a-power-space/ [22] European Commission. 2022. “2022 State of the Union Address by President von der Leyen.” September 14, 2022. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/ov/speech_22_5493 [23] Varhelyi, O. 2022. “[…] We make Georgia ready for becoming a member of the EU.” Twitter, November 18, 2022. https://twitter.com/OliverVarhelyi/status/1593483399678676992 [24] Agenda. Ge. 2022. “German chancellor: We are people of Europe, our voice must resound throughout Europe, from Lisbon to Tbilisi, beyond.” October 16, 2022, https://agenda.ge/en/news/2022/4013
* Lika Tchipashvili – I Secretary, Department of Europe, Division of Western Europe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia
Contents
Georgia’s European Perspective: New Impetus for Institutional and Quotidian Integration
Teimuraz Janjalia
The West’s Response to Russia’s War against Ukraine – an Analysis of Military, Political, Economic and Normative Aspects
Giorgi Robakidze
A New Wave of NATO Enlargement: Russian Response and Capabilities of Aspirant States
Irine Khuluzauri