The Integration Prospects of the EU’s Defence Sector amid Russia’s Military Aggression against Ukraine
Abstract
The article analyses current obstacles in the process of EU’s defence integration and the impact Russian military aggression against Ukraine in 2022 has on it. The article examines the degree to which the Russo-Ukrainian war may become a catalyst for the integration of the EU’s defence sector, prompting more openness of the member states to joint defence projects, with the EU achieving real defence autonomy notwithstanding the factor of NATO.
Aleksi Iasashvili
From the very first day of its inception, the EU developed as an entity focused mainly on economic integration, bringing unprecedented levels of prosperity to the continent. However, despite the economic prowess, the EU’s political integration remained deficient, and, despite the significant efforts to this end, the EU still finds it difficult to speak and act in unison on the international arena. Nevertheless, even political integration among the EU member states provides more grounds for hope than the EU’s ability to integrate militarily – integration in this field is still at a nascent stage. This is precisely why the description of the EU as an “economic giant, political dwarf and a military worm” remains relevant to this day.
The developments unfolding in Ukraine have at last awakened the European continent. Preparatory work for conducting integratory processes, however, started in 2016. Thus, at this point in time, even the traditionally passive member states are actively planning to stimulate their military potential, while the recent demonstration of Western unity is unprecedented. Nevertheless, many question marks hang over the existence of the necessary political will to transform the said steps into a real collective action aimed at the rejuvenation of the integratory processes in the defence and security sectors within the union.
The article briefly discusses the historical preconditions of the process at the heart of the debate, along with the factors that act as obstacles or advantages in terms of strengthening of EU’s collective defence. Finally, the paper presents conclusions and relevant assessments within the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine.
The idea of establishing a united European army is not a product of XXI century, it has been circulating actively since the second half of XX century. To paint a clearer picture, it would be relevant to provide a chronological order demonstrating the evolution of this policy.
The process began with the 1950 initiative of the French Prime Minister, Rene Pleven, which entailed the creation of a united European Defence Community. The initiative failed as it was not ratified by the French parliament, however, the idea persisted. The next significant milestone was reached in 1991 with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, which acted as the basis for the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and a unified defence policy. This, in turn, led to the formulation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 1999 and the signing of the Berlin+ Agreement in 2002, which allowed the EU to use NATO structures and mechanisms when conducting ESDP missions. The next steps included the following: the establishment of the European Defence Agency in 2004 and signing of the Lisbon Agreement in 2007, leading to significant changes to defence policy– namely, the ESDP was transformed into the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and PESCO was also established (to be discussed below2). 2007 also saw the creation of first Battlegroups under the auspices of the EU, which have, unfortunately, never been used in action. This fact alone is enough for sceptics to argue that any steps taken to this end is a waste of the European taxpayers’ money and do not contribute to the strengthening of European security.3
The integratory gap in EU’s security has many objective and subjective causes, including, primarily, the very nature of the EU as a union. The EU is unique in nature, as it incorporates the supranational component, which is institutionally represented by the European Commission. EU member states have willingly gi8ven up a portion of their sovereignty across many dimensions, delegating their national prerogatives to the supranational structures.4 This decision resulted in economic development across various sectors, at least partially contributing to the fact that the EU is currently the third largest economy in the world (after the U.S. and China).
As demonstrated by the history of European integration, the path toward establishing a supranational structure has not been easy and entailed successes and setbacks alike. The reason for this does not come as a surprise for anyone – states protect their sovereignty and have legitimate ambition to retain their autonomy to the furthest extent.5 Security-related issues represent the most sensitive matters when it comes to sovereignty. Once again, it is not difficult to figure out the logic behind this reasoning: security aspects are directly linked to the survival of the state and, therefore, even a partial concession of power pushes very close to the red lines. It would be logical to note at this point that whether the member states are sidelined from policy-making in this area is heavily debated. Some think that the EU is essentially still an inter-governmental body rather than a supranational entity, as main functions and the modus operandi of the EU are still determined by the European Council, which is comprised of the leaders of the Union’s member states.6
Another historically determined obstacle relates to NATO. As NATO has long guaranteed European security, there was no need to establish a parallel structure7 that, ultimately, would merely duplicate the functions of NATO. The UK was especially critical in this regard, as it did not find it problematic that European security depended on external actors. Despite the fact that the supporters of the European Defence Community represented largely marginal groups, they continued lobbying for the idea, believing that a historical moment would arrive when more member states shared it.
In response to the criticism regarding the duplication of NATO functions, the supporters of the idea note that it is fundamentally wrong to assume that the choice has to made between NATO and the EU’s defence community as success of the latter would only strengthen NATO’s European flank;8 Therefore, what is good for EU’s defence is also good for NATO.
Others argue that Europe is not yet ready for achieving integration in the defence area due to the expected distribution of power in the future military structure. While the U.S. occupies a leading position in NATO due to objective reasons, who can take up this mantle for the EU? Naturally, after ‘Brexit’, France and Germany are the most obvious candidates.9 France’s readiness to become the locomotive of this process is confirmed by the statements of President Emmanuel Macron. Nevertheless, whatever readiness France may demonstrate, the success of the project critically depends on the political will of Germany to allocate its resources towards defence integration.
The above-mentioned point brings us back to the origins of the EU, namely the European Coal and Steel Community, which, as an economic project, represented a means rather than an end. The end essentially boiled down to a peace project – with the increase in economic interdependence, war as a means would become inexpedient; potential aggressor itself would incur significant damage if it attacked other state that was part of the integration project – this was especially so when it came to resources such as steel and coal that are vital for waging a war. The architects of the Community thought this form of integration would prevent Germany and France’s never-ending propensity to go to war with each other.10
Despite all of the above, the tragedies of the XX century, especially the two World Wars, are clearly imprinted in the collective European psyche; ergo, the image of a militarising Germany would leave a bad aftertaste across the continent. This is particularly visible in Poland11; the Polish leadership overtly indicates that Warsaw is not ready to accept German hegemony in Europe. It must be noted that at this point in time there is no consensus in Germany itself whether it would benefit the country to become a centre of initiating such defence integration projects.12 Nevertheless, it is apparent that, in this regard, the new German government also leans toward multilateralism.
Furthermore, the hesitant attitude of the Eastern European EU members toward such projects can be explained by the centrality of the significance that NATO’s security umbrella plays in their security. Poland and the Baltic States will be the first to take the brunt of the conflict, as, unlike the Western European states, they lack a geographic buffer.13 Therefore, the perception of Russia as the main security threat displayed the logic of geographic gradation, progressively decreasing from east to west.
Before highlighting the significance of the 2022 Russo-Ukraine War, other events – that paved the way for ensuring member states more openness to the idea of achieving EU’s integration in the military domain – merit discussion.
A primary precondition for the promotion of the once-fringe idea of defence integration in Europe was the foreign policy of President Donald Trump, which caused a rift among the U.S. and its traditional allies accompanied with criticism for not spending the minimum 2% of GDP that every NATO member – especially Germany 14 – ought to pay into the coffers of the alliance. Trump’s position was severely harsh toward those who wanted to continue freeriding at the expense of the US – taking the security guarantee provided by NATO for granted, without adequately contributing to its maintenance. This allowed the Europeans to come to the realisation that the security umbrella provided by the U.S. does not represent a given and Europe needs its own autonomous tools to effectively react to and deal with the arisen threats on the continent.
Another significant development impacting the overall situation was “Brexit”, that left the EU without a very important member which advocated against the idea of the EU’s defence community, weakening the ‘against’ camp and naturally creating new opportunities.
As demonstrated by the history of European integration, constant attempts to reach a consensus acted as one of the central obstacles in terms of advancing integratory processes. Furthermore, reaching a consensus became progressively difficult as new members were admitted to the union – decisions might have endangered the red lines of at least one member state, while, in search for consensus, all states could have used veto and blocked the process. Having realized this, it was established that, on some issues, decisions would be made based on a qualified majority, with the consensual decision-making being reserved for matters of utmost significance.15 For example, the ineffective response of the EU to the migrant crisis and the Eurozone crisis was determined by precisely this internal structure of the organisation.
These developments helped to re-evaluate integratory processes in general. It, thus, became voluntary to engage in integratory projects, even if a state had EU membership. This would allow the EU to avoid gridlocks, while the initiative in question would be further developed, with the Schengen Agreement acting as a good example of such action. It is noteworthy that the Commission often mentions the idea of defence community, referring to the initiative as “Defensive Schengen Agreement”16 – in other words, integration across this dimension would also be voluntary. This represents another aspect of the multi-speed EU idea, which increases the autonomy of member states in determining the degree and area of engagement.17 This ultimately resulted in the opening up of a new discussion regarding the differentiated integration.
On the other hand, the idea of a multi-speed Europe created a lot of anxiety over the fact that it might result in the isolation of those members that choose to refrain from active engagement, which would ultimately lead to the emergence of more integrated and less integrated groups within the union. The establishment of such groups would go against the goal of the EU to maintain unity, which is an absolute precondition for the union to be able to speak in one voice on the international arena.
As noted above, the developments surrounding Ukraine cannot be discussed as a self-contained factor consolidating Europe. Even as far back as 2014, after the annexation of Crimea, the European Commission actively proposed new defence initiatives. However, due to the sensitive nature of the proposals, novelty aspects would be played down; instead, the framework of Common Foreign and Security Policy would become the referent point, along with the activation of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), which the former President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, metaphorically characterized as “sleeping beauty”.18
The first significant step was taken with the adoption of the Global Strategy for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy in 2016, which outlined EU’s ambition to play a more active role in the dynamic security environment.19 The EU needed to back up its political capital with military competence. The instrument of the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) was a part of the Global Strategy and entailed the widening of fields of cooperation and stimulation of the substitution of individual efforts with collective action.20
The European Defence Fund (EDF) was to play one of the most significant roles in this dimension, consolidating the efforts of member states in order to support investments in the security sector both in terms of research and procurement. The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) was established as a framework institution, within the framework of which defence projects would be undertaken. Its goal was to consolidate resources and coordinate logistics and supply, planning and defence procurements.21 Despite the ambitious nature of the project, its role was limited to the missions related to disarmament, humanitarian issues, conflict prevention, as well as peace and crisis management.
The unmasked Russian aggression against Ukraine shocked virtually the entire world. Even the most respected experts found it difficult to believe that the Kremlin would do such a thing. Certain EU member states’ engagement with Russia prior to the war created the illusion –which ultimately ended up with frustration – that Moscow, acting as a rational actor, would be more concessionary and would not undermine the mutually beneficial economic cooperation. Russia not only brought war back to Europe but also a distrust – distrust not among states per se, but in the rationality itself and undermined belief that no leader or state would act irrationally, where others would only opt for rational decisions.
The lack of trust and disappointment, in turn, resulted in the imposition of an unprecedented series of sanctions packages against Russia by the EU, which demonstrated both unity and readiness to act. The declaration issued during an informal meeting of leaders of EU member states held in March of 2022 clearly outlines EU’s vision regarding the union’s revised role in the upholding of the rules-based international order built on the principles of international law. It also contained a passage concerning the significant gap between EU’s capabilities and challenges stemming from the dynamism in the international security realm. Along with increasing military budget and development of capabilities, the activation of NATO-EU cooperation was also emphasised, underscoring that increased security functions of the EU are to complement NATO’s functions rather than replace them.22 It is noteworthy that there is a similar passage in the new U.S. National Security Strategy as well, which clearly indicates that the U.S. welcomes the EU’s efforts in this regard.23 It is interesting that in a practical sense the European leaders emphasised the issue of so-called “enablers”, namely: aerial tankers, high-speed operations, transport aircraft, air and missile defence systems (and their uses).24 EU member states have traditionally relied on the U.S. in this regard. This became clear during the 2012 French operations in Mali. The declaration of the European Council also clearly demonstrated that leaders were ready to achieve tangible results in terms of filling in the aforementioned gap.
The Ukraine War required an effective response, which, in turn, naturally, requires vast resources. Germany, thus, became naturally under pressure due to the reasonable doubts regarding Berlin’s readiness to terminate the “Nord Stream 2” project regardless of an act of open aggression. The consensus reached in the West, inter alia regarding the banning of Russian banks from the Swift platform, demonstrated that EU member states have closed the gap in threat-perception, which solved a part of the existing problems associated with defence integration in the union with most countries being on the same page.
In March the EU announced that it was planning to establish a 5 000-strong, rapid-deployment contingent that would operate independently from NATO command, which, naturally, represents a long process. Nevertheless, it would be logical to assume that the Ukrainian issue and the convergence of positions within the EU regarding security shortened the duration of the process, while also making it easier. The announcement was followed up with a statement outlining that the establishment of the said unit should not be interpreted as the establishment of a “European Army”, especially considering that most EU member states still view the term with a healthy dose of scepticism. “Rome was not built in a day” – a motto well-understood by Europeans, acts as a reminder that even during opportune moments, aggressive diplomacy may turn out to be counterproductive.
The change in the perception toward “European Army” among the European public also plays an important role. The idea has become even more against the backdrop of the developments in Ukraine. It must be taken into account that, despite ‘Brexit’, it was the UK public that registered the highest swing in favour (10%) of establishing a united military. Additionally, there are outliers like Hungary, Romania and Greece – where populations are now less likely to vote for a united “European Army”.
It is noteworthy that the aggression perpetrated against Ukraine forced Denmark to hold a referendum on its three-decade-long position on European security policy. Namely, the Danes voted to end their opt-out from the CSDP. This is the result of the so-called Edinburgh Compromise, which became necessary to introduce after the failure of Denmark to ratify the Maastricht Treaty. Naturally, Danish participation in the Common Security and Defence Policy will provide a tangible impetus to the ambitious projects that were announced in Brussels after the start of the Ukraine War. It is also interesting within the framework of the Danish issue that the both EU members Finland and Sweden decided to rely on NATO for security guarantees. This decision clearly illustrated that, despite the tangible progress within the framework of the EU’s CSDP, rather than diminishing, the factor of NATO is virtually as important as it was during the Cold War
Another significant outcome of the Russo-Ukrainian war concerns the ongoing debates inside the EU, regarding how the union will make decisions within the framework of the CSDP; instead of a consensus vote, it is proposed to introduce a qualified majority rule. Speculations around this topic go back to pre-war period, as inflexible nature of decision-making was hindering progress within the framework of CFSP.
Immediately after assuming the office of the President of the European Commission in 2019, Ursula Von Der Leyen underscored that it was necessary to establish a geopolitical EU. She also continuously advocated for the introduction of the qualified majority rule, however, the initiative did not see any further development until 2022; now there is hope and, more importantly, there is a significant lobby for this initiative to become a reality. The Czech Republic exerted significant efforts during its chairmanship of the European Council in 2022 with the goal of formulating specific guidelines, questionnaires, in order to illustrate more clearly where it was possible to adopt new rules in accordance with the position of each individual EU member.27 The main obstacle in terms of introducing the qualified majority rule within the framework of the CFSP concerns the fact that a consensus has to be reached; however, considering the unwavering position of large states like Germany, the prospect of its adoption seems more realistic than ever.
At this point it must also be underscored that it would be incorrect to assess all of the above-mentioned developments as preparatory work for establishing a defence community. The response of several EU members may actually be counterproductive in this regard, due to many reasons. Despite agreements reached on the EU level, Germany and Poland decided to stock up on non-EU equipment (mainly US and Korean). Also, despite the fact that European states are coming to understand risks associated with neglecting the security issue, they still plan to address said challenges separately.28 They prefer to strengthen existing structures and receive measurable outcomes (more spending equates to increased security), rather than setting up new, untested institutions and initiatives especially during an actual crisis.
The EU has spent the recent decades deep in its comfort zone, opting to project exclusively soft power. Having NATO’s security guarantees, there was no vital impulse in Europe to pursue defence integration. No single event can be identified as the sole contributor to the realization that is gripping European minds regarding the necessity to achieve higher autonomy on the security and defence issue; as noted above, neither can the developments in Ukraine be described as the final stage of the process. Akin every other integratory project, the process will take a long time to materialise as usual, especially against the backdrop of the immense bureaucracy of the EU. This is partially the reason why EU member states opt to invest in existing security structures when responding to short-term threats, rather than engaging in integratory projects based on a long-term vision.
Despite this, the overt attack on European security perpetrated by the Russian Federation will leave a visible mark. Only time will tell whether it will act as the necessary impulse to formulate a common vision. If this will be enough to overcome subjective and often phantom fears and internal distrust, European capitals may realise that expansion of defence cooperation and compatibility will allow them to qualitatively increase the level of security on the continent even without increasing military budget.
Seeing its future in the European and Euro-Atlantic structures, Georgia finds it important to observe these processes. Hotspots on the European continent and Russia’s hybrid warfare are tightly interconnected. In retrospect we can argue that had the process of Europe’s defence integration gone quicker, establishing a sizable task-force, it would have acted as the precondition to prevent the sabotage-oriented policy of the Kremlin. At this point in time we can only discuss future capabilities that would be provided for the EU by a defence system that is more deeply integrated, along with the transformative influence it would have both on the continent, as well as beyond.
Notes:
* A minimal threshold of support of 55% of member states, with at least 65% of the overall EU population, is required to be met.
* Aleksi Iasashvili – II Secretary, Political Department, Division of Conflict Regulation Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia
Contents
Georgia’s European Perspective: New Impetus for Institutional and Quotidian Integration
Teimuraz Janjalia
The West’s Response to Russia’s War against Ukraine – an Analysis of Military, Political, Economic and Normative Aspects
Giorgi Robakidze
A New Wave of NATO Enlargement: Russian Response and Capabilities of Aspirant States
Irine Khuluzauri