The West’s Response to Russia’s War against Ukraine – an Analysis of Military, Political, Economic and Normative Aspects

Abstract

The following article deliberates upon the actions taken by EU and NATO member states in response to the Russian military aggression perpetrated against Ukraine and the influence of said actions on the political and economic situation within Russia, as well as on the strengthening of Ukraine’s defence capabilities and resilience. Additionally, the article briefly touches upon the key factors contributing to the existing support toward Ukraine, along with the potential challenges faced by the global order underpinned by the norms of international law.

Giorgi Robakidze

After conducting large-scale military drills adjacent to Ukraine’s borders, as well as issuing absurd ultimatums to the government of Ukraine and Western countries, on February 24th of 2022 the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, ordered his troops to enter Ukraine, launching a full-scale military aggression against his western neighbour.

The Russian government had hoped to ‘blitz’ across Ukraine and take the capital, Kyiv, in a short period, however, nine months into the war the reality on the ground is completely different. The armed forces of Ukraine managed to stifle Russia’s advance, take initiative into their own hands on the battlefield and conduct counteroffensives, liberating a part of their sovereign territory.

The aforementioned success was determined by two key factors, along with the selfless resistance of the Ukrainian fighters: large-scale military, political, economic and humanitarian support provided to Ukraine by the West (primarily, NATO and EU member states) and the unprecedented sanctions introduced against the Russian Federation.

The article discusses the specific sanctions that were introduced by the EU, US, and other leading Western countries against the Russian Federation, their effectiveness in terms of the impact on the Russian economy, as well as possible expectations for short and mid-term periods. The article also analyses factors that determine such unprecedented unity among Western nations in terms of support provided for Ukraine, and potential challenges the West may face in the future.

Prior to the invasion, heads of leading Western nations continuously warned the Kremlin of the large-scale sanctions that would be introduced against Russia in case of a full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Concurrently, the US, and EU member states attempted to deescalate the situation using diplomatic means. On January 26th of 2022, the US and NATO officially responded to Russia’s security demands in writing.1 Additionally, several telephone conversations were held between the Russian and US presidents, with the French President, Emmanuel Macron and the German Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, visiting Moscow for an in-person meeting with Vladimir Putin.

Despite the aforementioned attempts, on February 24th of 2022, Russia launched a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine. As expected, a timely response by the West came immediately in the form of the first package of economic sanctions introduced against Russia by the Council of the European Union.

The package entailed restrictions for the financial, energy and transport sectors, including the ban on the export of dual-use products and the tightening of visa requirements for Russian citizens. A decision was also made to freeze the assets of the Russian President, Vladimir Putin and the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov. Sanctions were introduced against the members of the Russian State Duma and the National Security Council (as well as those closely associated with the Russian government) with their assets expropriated. Transactions of the Russian Central Bank were frozen, and Russian aviation companies were banned from entering EU’s airspace or landing in EU’s airports.2

Overall, since the commencement of military action, the EU has introduced eight packages of sanctions against the Russian Federation that include the following restrictions:

  • The largest Russian defence companies were placed under sanctions: ОБОРОНОПРОМ, УРАЛВАГОНЗАВОД, ОБЪЕДИНЕННАЯ АВИАСТРОИ-ТЕЛЬНАЯ КОРПОРАЦИЯ. Granting loans to said companies for a longer than 30 days was banned, as well as the provision of dual-use products.
  • Five leading Russian banks were also placed under sanctions: ГАЗПРОМБАНК, РОССЕЛЬХОЗБАНК, СБЕРБАНК, ВНЕШЭКОНОМБАНК and ВТБ. The said banks had their access to the European Capital Markets restricted.
  • Cooperation with Russian energy companies was also restricted, banning the exports of innovative extractive technologies and services, such as drilling and testing used by Russian companies to develop deep-water, Arctic and shale oil reserves.3

Two independent working groups were established in order to effectively implement the aforementioned sanctions: Russian Elites, Proxies, and Oligarchs (REPO)4 and Freeze and Seize.5 As a result of coordinated efforts by these groups, financial assets  belonging to Russian  citizens placed under sanctions, were identified and confiscated within the EU member states.

Yachts belonging to Russian oligarchs, along with the real estate were also confiscated, with their cumulative market value amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars. Apart from individuals, the EU sanctions also affected Russia’s Central Bank, which had its access to European markets restricted, freezing assets worth $300 billion.6

On December 3rd of 2022, the Council of the European Union, G7 members, and Australia agreed to place a cap of $60 per barrel for crude oil transported via sea-lanes originating from Russia.7

Concurrently, the EU actively provided both military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine from the very first days of the war. The Asylum and Temporary Protection mechanism was enacted for Ukrainian refugees fleeing into the EU, allocating €20 billion to support the process. In order to assist in the economic stabilisation of Ukraine, the EU allocated €9 billion, while military aid amounted to €2.5 billion.8 Additionally, the European Commission, in coordination with the Government of Ukraine and the World Bank, assessed the damage to Ukraine caused by the war, which stood at €349 billion on June 1st of 2022. However, this number will continue to grow as the war continues.9 Along with the EU, the sanctions were also introduced against the Russian federation by the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. Similar to the EU, the said nations sanctioned the financial, energy and transport sectors, entailing a ban on the exports of dual-use and high-tech products, including microchips and semi-conductors.

As for NATO, which constitutes a military union, its mandate does not entail the provision of military hardware or imposing sanctions to individual states – that prerogative remains with individual member states. NATO Secretary General remarked several times that the Alliance does not intend to enter direct military confrontation with Russia, however, if need be, NATO is ready to protect every inch of its members’ territory.10

The sanctions introduced against the Russian Federation by the US Government are particularly noteworthy, along with the military, economic and humanitarian aid provided to Ukraine. Overall, within the framework of Appropriation Acts issued by the US Congress (USAA; P.L. 117-103, Div. N; AUSAA; P.L. 117-128), 54 billion dollars of  aid was issued to Ukraine.11 From the day of the Russian invasion to today, President Biden’s administration introduced the following sanctions against the Russian Federation:

  • The Russian President, Vladimir Putin; PM, Mikhail Mishustin; members of the National Security Council, including the Foreign Minister, Minister of Finance, Minister of Economic Development, Head of the Armed Forces, most of the Duma MPs and other representatives of Russian elites associated with the Kremlin had access to their real estate and assets in the US blocked. The visa restrictions were placed upon 3 100 military personnel and 650 civil servants.
  • As for Russia’s industrial sector, sanctions were introduced against Russia’s state-owned energy company – ГАЗПРОМ; Russia’s railway company – РОССИЙСКИЕ ЖЕЛЕЗНЫЕ ДОРОГИ (РЖД); Russia’s largest naval and transport company – СОВКОМФЛОТ; state-owned company responsible for the development of high-tech production and exports – РОСТЕХ; state-owned companies operating in the defence, production sector and technologies; Russian aviation and space firms; Russia’s largest diamond mining company – АЛРОСА; Russia’s largest steel producing company – СЕВЕРСТАЛЬ; companies that own “Nord Stream II”; media platforms that spread disinformation and propaganda and their representatives, and crypto-mining firms.
  • Within the finance sector, sanctions were placed upon Russia’s Central Bank and six of the country’s largest banks having their access restricted to their dollar reserves, banning their operations in the US altogether. The U.S. companies were also banned from making additional investments.
  • Restrictions introduced in terms of trade with Russia are particularly noteworthy. Namely, the pre-existing trade model was terminated and exports of the U.S.-made technologies (even if the technology was produced in a third state using U.S.-made parts) to Russia were banned.
  • Import of Russian crude oil, oil products, LNG, coal, gold, diamonds, seafood and alcohol into the US was banned;
  • Export of US luxury goods and US Dollar denominations to Russia was banned;
  • Entry of Russian aircraft into US airspace was banned;
  • Docking of Russian ships in US ports was banned.13

In order to effectively implement the aforementioned sanctions, the US Department of Justice created a special intergovernmental inquiry group (Task Force KleptoCapture)14, which mainly focuses on the task of identifying violations (and involved individuals) of sanctions introduced against Russian citizens and companies.

Military aid provided to Ukraine by the US is also impressive. From the beginning of 2022 to this day, the U.S. has provided Ukraine with the following supplies: Stinger and Javelin systems, Switchblade, Phoenix Ghost, and Scan Eagle drones, Mi-17 helicopters, airspace surveillance radars, NASAMS and HIMARS MRLS, artillery pieces of various calibres with appropriate precision-strike shells, tactical trucks and multi-core armoured vehicles of high mobility, IFVs, ammunition, night-vision goggles, thermal-vision systems, and optical and laser sights.15

Graph #1 illustrates the U.S. aid provided to Ukraine comprehensively, depicting the military, financial and humanitarian aid provided to Ukraine by top 10 largest contributors from January 24th of 2022 to October 3rd of 2022.

Graph #1: “Military, Humanitarian and Financial Support Provided for Ukraine (€Billion)”, Source – Antezza et al. 2022. „The Ukraine Support Tracker” Kiel WP.16

Aid provided to Ukraine by the Government of Georgia (GoG) is also noteworthy, namely:

  • The GoG has allocated GEL1 million ($315,457) from the government’s reserve funds in support of the Ukrainian people;
  • 104 350 tonnes of humanitarian aid, mostly food, clothes and medicine were sent to Ukraine;
  • Special programmes were implemented for Ukrainian refugees coming to Georgia, entailing the provision of accommodation, necessary items, clothing, food, medical services (including psychological support for the children) etc.;
  • Various types of medical products were sent to Ukraine’s Public Health Centre, including: tetanus vaccines – 2 000 units, TD (tetanus-diphtheria vaccine) – 20 000 units, hepatitis B vaccine – 30 000 units, BCG vaccine – 40 000 units;

It is also noteworthy that, along with the aid provided by the GoG, Ukraine is also supported by the Georgian private sector, NGOs and individual citizens.17

Despite the loud-ringing statements of the Kremlin that the sanctions imposed by Western countries are ineffective and cause minimal harm to Russia’s economy, in reality, the sanctions are rather effective. This can be confirmed by analysing Russia’s macro-economic indicators.

According to analysis published by the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Russia’s GDP will shrink by 14.8% in 2022. Additionally, Russia will be most affected by the fact that Western direct foreign investment will leave the country (view graph #2).

Change (%) in real GDP of Russia

Graph #2. „Change (%) in real GDP”, source: CEOR. 2022. „Potential economic effects of sanctions on Russia.“ 18

Additionally, in a mid-term perspective, Russian imports will decrease by 50.7%, with exports shrinking by 22.6%. Considering that Western countries will only lose 0.52% of their GDP due to the imposed sanctions, this is a significant comparative margin. Western imports are projected to decrease by 0.21%, with exports decreasing by 0.28%.19

According to the assessment of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Russian economy will shrink by 8.5% in 2022, with inflation rising to 24%; unemployment is projected to double to 9.6%.20

Over 750 international companies suspended their operations in Russia as of October 2022 within the framework of the imposed sanctions. Furthermore, several large-scale Russian manufacturers also suspended their operations, due to the lack of Western-produced parts and services (such as computer software, or audits conducted by large bookkeeping firms). Considering all of the above, according to the assessment of the Mayor of Moscow, Sergei Sobyanin, 200 000 people will lose their jobs in the Russian capital alone.20

It can be argued that the disintegration of the post-Cold war European security architecture began as far back as 2008 when Russia invaded Georgia, continuing in 2014 with Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Eventually, this resulted in the full-scale invasion launched by Russia in 2022. When analysing the factors contributing to the West’s support for Ukraine, it is necessary to discuss both geopolitical and historical contexts, providing us with a clearer frame of reference for determining moral aspects of said support.

After the dissolution of the USSR, Ukraine inherited a large nuclear arsenal (ranked third globally). On December 5th of 1994, Ukraine signed a document guaranteeing the country’s security, known as the Budapest Memorandum, according to which nuclear-armed states such as the US, the UK, and Russia were politically obligated to guarantee Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. In turn, Ukraine would have to give up its nuclear arsenal, signing the UN’s Non-Proliferation Treaty.21

In parallel with the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and the initiation of military action in Eastern Ukraine in 2014, the Ukrainian government regularly approached the guarantors that were party to the Budapest Memorandum in order to seek assistance; however, all efforts were in vain. Neither the US nor the UK were apparently ready for direct military confrontation with Russia, despite their commitment to defend Ukraine. At the same time, Washington, along with NATO and EU member states, was very well aware of their moral obligation to defend Ukraine, attempting to provide active political and economic support from the first days of the crisis.

According to the report published by the Trans-Atlantic Academy of the U.S., the West’s approach toward the conflict in Ukraine is four-pronged:

1) Inadmissibility of direct military confrontation with Russia;

2) Convincing Russia via diplomatic channels (including on the highest level) to change its course;

3) Conducting coercive action against Russia, including in terms of economic and political sanctions;

4) Active support toward Ukraine both in terms of economic and military aid, aiming to strengthen Ukraine’s defence capabilities and resilience.23

Over the recent decade, the global order based on the norms of international law started to change. In the 1990s, Western liberal democratic model had no alternatives in terms of military, economic and ideological dimensions. However, since the beginning of the 21st century, the U.S. and European influences began to wane, with China and Russia emerging as formidable opponents that unconditionally enter alliance with other nations, unlike the West’s insistence on conditionality in terms of the protection of human rights, etc. As aptly noted by professor at the New Delhi–based Centre for Policy Research and co-author of the Indian Nuclear Doctrine, Brahma Chellaney, Russia and China have a simple approach based on the principle of “International law may be powerful against the powerless, but it is powerless against the powerful. 24

The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the EU, Josep Borrell, stated: “Russian aggression perpetrated against Ukraine directly challenges the world order based on the norms of international law.”25 Therefore, the EU must do everything in its power to support Ukraine. NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg was even more blunt in his assessment: “[the West] is paying a heavy price for supporting Ukraine. […] However, this price will be even higher if Russia and other authoritarian regimes start believing that they can invade neighbouring countries and avoid international law. […] We have a moral responsibility to aid an independent democracy in the heart of Europe.”26

The Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24th of 2022 launched the biggest and deadliest conflict on the European continent since WWII. This event represents what the Germans call “Zeitenwende”27 – a pivotal point in history, which affects everything from international trade to global security. This is a momentous occasion with serious implications for future security of Western nations, especially in Europe. Ignoring Russia’s actions will only exacerbate the outcomes of this process, ultimately burying the global political system that rests on the norms of international law.

Three key components will decide whether Ukraine can be successful: 1) Bravery and resilience of the Ukrainian people, 2) continuation and strengthening of military and economic aid, and 3) maintaining sanctions imposed upon Russia, widening their scope, depriving the Kremlin of capacity to wage a military campaign.

It is not be an overstatement to say that we are currently witnessing the emergence of a new multipolar world order, which will be heavily impacted by the level of readiness of the West to protect its values, primarily, the inviolability of sovereign statehood and the principle of freedom of countries to choose their foreign policy directions.

[1] Forgey, Q. 2022. “U.S. delivers written response to Russian demands amid Ukraine crisis.” Politico, January 26, 2022. https://www.politico.com/news/2022/01/26/us-russia-ukraine-written-response-00002414

[2] European Council/Council of the European Union. n.d. “Timeline – EU restrictive measures against Russia over Ukraine.” https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/history-restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/

[3] Russell. M. 2022. “Western sanctions and Russia What are they? Do they work?.” European Parliamentary Research Service . February 17, 2022. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_IDA(2022)698930

[4] European Commission. 2022. “Russian Elites, Proxies, and Oligarchs Task Force Joint Statement.” June 29, 2022. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_22_4232

[5] European Commission. 2022. “Enforcing sanctions against listed Russian and Belarussian oligarchs: Commission’s “Freeze and Seize” Task Force steps up work with international partners.”March 17, 2022. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_22_1828

[6] იქვე.

[7] European Commission. 2022. “G7 agrees oil price cap: reducing Russia’s revenues, while keeping global energy markets stable.” December 3, 2022. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_22_7468

[8] European Council/Council of the European Union. n.d. “EU solidarity with Ukraine.“ https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-response-ukraine-invasion/eu-solidarity-ukraine/

[19] European Commission. 2022. “Joint press release: Ukraine Recovery and Reconstruction Needs Estimated $349 Billion (€349 Billion).” September 9, 2022. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_5428

[10] NATO. 2022. “Remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and US President Joe Biden at the start of the 2022 NATO Summit.” June 29, 2022. https://bit.ly/3FSWZf4

[11] Welt, C. 2022. “Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine: Overview of U.S. Sanctions and Other Responses.” Congressional Research Service, October 21, 2022. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IN11869.pdf

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] The United States Department of Justice. 2022. “Attorney General Merrick B. Garland Announces Launch of Task Force KleptoCapture.” March 2, 2022. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-merrick-b-garland-announces-launch-task-force-kleptocapture

[15] U.S. Department of State. 2022. “U.S. Security Cooperation with Ukraine.” December 9, 2022. https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-ukraine/

[16] Antezza et al. 2022. “Government support to Ukraine: Type of assistance, € billion.” The Kiel Institute for the World Economy. https://www.ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker/

[17] Data provided by the Department of Economic Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia.

[18] Mahlstein, L, McDaniel, C, Schropp, S and Tsigas, M. 2022. “Estimating the Economic Effects of Sanctions on Russia: an Allied Trade Embargo.” Working Paper. European University Institute. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/74493

[19] იქვე.

[20] Nelson, M. R. 2022. “Russia’s War on Ukraine: The Economic Impact of Sanctions.” Congressional Research Service, May 3, 2022. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12092

[21] Matthew, L. 2022. “Despite Putin’s claims that the West’s ‘economic blitzkrieg strategy didn’t work,’ Moscow’s mayor says the city is about to lose 200,000 jobs.” BusinessInsider, April 19, 2022. https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-200000-jobs-western-companies-exit-moscow-mayor-2022-4?r=US&IR=T

[22] Steven, P. 2014. “The Budapest Memorandum and U.S. Obligations.” Brookings. December 4, 2014. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2014/12/04/the-budapest-memorandum-and-u-s-obligations/

[23] Ulrich, S. 2016. “The West’s Response to the Ukraine Conflict.” Transatlantic Academy, 2015-2016 Paper Series No.4. https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/Speck_WestResponseUkraine_Apr16_web.pdf

[24] Chellaney, B. 2022. “Putin’s war and the mirage of the rules-based order.” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, March 23, 2022. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/putins-war-and-the-mirage-of-the-rules-based-order/

[25] EEAS. 2022. “Taking action on the geopolitical consequences of Russia’s war.“ June 24, 2022. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/taking-action-geopolitical-consequences-russia%E2%80%99s-war_en. Informal translation by author.

[26] Stoltenberg, J. 2022. “Nato will pay a price but we must stay the course on Ukraine.” The Financial Times, September 7, 2022. https://www.ft.com/content/d5bbd979-ae7e-4125-abcb-16368be3dcaf. Informal translation by author

[27] Collins Dictionary. n.d. “Zeitenwende.” https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/german-english/zeitenwende; Scholz, O. 2022. “The Global Zeitenwende: How to Avoid a New Cold War in a Multipolar Era.” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2022. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/germany/olaf-scholz-global-zeitenwende-how-avoid-new-cold-war

[28] Flockhart, T and Korosteleva A, E. “War in Ukraine: Putin and the multi-order world.” Contemporary Security Policy, 43(3):466-481

* Giorgi Robakidze – Senior Counsellor, the Mission of Georgia to NATO, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia