The Contours of US-China Cold War and Competing Views on the International Order
Abstract
The U.S.-China interests often conflict, mainly across the following dimensions: Taiwan, regional security in the Indo-Pacific (including the waters of the East and South China Seas), China’s growing military capabilities, human rights violations (particularly in Xinjiang), Hong-Kong, and trade wars. The two parties have spent years in disagreement on these issues. Along with other developments, the issue of COVID-19 pandemic, the issue of the expansion of Chinese companies and 5G technology, cyber-attacks perpetrated by Chinese hackers, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have been added to these traditional topics of contention, negatively affecting Sino-US relations, turning the dichotomy into a “New Cold War”.
Davit Pipinashvili
The strategic competition between the US and China, with its ideological and technological components, has become the defining paradigm of contemporary international relations, determining global military, political and economic dynamics. Development of new technologies and the military industrial complex, in turn, became an integral part of the systemic rivalry. Sino-U.S. trade conflicts also act as an instrumental factor affecting the global order.1 The policy of strategic containment of China, inaugurated by Donald Trump, continued through to the Biden Administration (2021-2022)*.
Initially, the article focuses on the aspect of strategic rivalry between the U.S. and China. Next, the impact of Russia, and its invasion of Ukraine on Sino-U.S. relations is discussed. Finally, the paper deliberates upon the Global Security Initiative proposed by China and its possible impact on the global order.
On December 4th of 2019, NATO issued the London Declaration, which was the first document referring to China and its increasing influence on international politics, regarding it a systemic challenge.2 On March 19th of 2020, Donald Trump accused China of purposefully concealing information regarding the COVID-19 epidemic, noting that such actions caused the epidemic to grow into a global pandemic. In July of 2020, Washington demanded from Beijing to close its Consulate General in Houston (State of Texas), accusing Chinese hackers of stealing intellectual property and confidential business information. According to the Department of Justice (DoJ) of the US, the hackers committed the aforementioned crimes under the orders of Chinse Ministry of State Security3 China closed the US Consulate General in Chengdu (Sichuan Province) in response. Concurrently, on July 9th of 2020, President Trump signed a law sanctioning China. On February 23rd of 2021, shortly after President Biden’s inauguration, the U.S. Department of State regarded the situation in Xinjiang as a genocide of the Uyghur people and a crime against humanity.4
On March 16th of 2021, a session of the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee (2+2) was held, within the framework of which the strength of the existing strategic alliance between the two countries was underscored. The joint statement criticised China, arguing that Beijing disrupts the global order, creating political, economic, military and technological risks for the international community.5 The State and Defence Secretaries of the U.S. take the responsibility to oppose Beijing’s actions. The declaration covers various topics, including: article 5 of the U.S.-Japanese security agreement (obligating Washington to protect Japan, including the Senkaku Islands); stability in the Taiwan strait; China’s illegal claims over the waters of the South China Sea; and human rights violations in the Xinjiang autonomous region, as well as Hong-Kong. On March 17th, the representative of the Chinese Foreign Service condemned the said document, dubbing it counterproductive for Chinese interests. According to the aforementioned spokesperson, in their attempt to encircle China with hostile intent, both the U.S. and Japan have been guided by the Cold War and Bloc Confrontation mentality.6
On March 18th of 2021, Sino-U.S. strategic dialogue was held in Anchorage (State of Alaska) at the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. This constituted the first high-level meeting between the two parties since the Biden Administration took office. Beijing attempted to convince the U.S. to retract sanctions placed upon Chinese physical and legal entities (to lift restrictions imposed upon Chinse companies like “Huawei” and “SMIC”)**. Washington, in turn, focused mainly on the human rights issue.7
On May 9th of 2022, the official representative of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs criticised the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), accusing the institution of escalating confrontation, dubbing it the “Second Central Intelligence Agency” (CIA).8 Furthermore, the Chinse diplomat accused the organisation of orchestrating “Colour Revolutions” abroad, including Ukraine and Georgia.9 Anti-Chinese activity of the institution was also noted, especially in terms of the support displayed for Taiwan’s “independence” and destructive elements in Xinjiang, Hong-Kong, and Tibet.10
On May 26th of 2022, the U.S. Secretary of State, Antony Blinken presented a report that named China the central and most serious long-term challenge to the international order, despite Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.11 Along with the overview of the human rights problems in Xinjiang, Tibet and Hong-Kong, Blinken criticised the Chinese President, noting that under Xi Jinping’s administration, Chinese Communist Party became more repressive at home and more aggressive abroad.12 According to the Secretary of State, President Joe Biden ordered the Department of Defence to conduct “integrated deterrence”13 against China – the main rival of the U.S. – in order to guarantee supremacy of the Pentagon. Naturally, the above-mentioned report was met with a harsh assessment from Beijing. On May 27th, the official spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Blinken was disseminating disinformation regarding the “Chinese Threat”, thus, interfering in China’s internal affairs, in order to retain Washington’s global hegemony. As for the Sino-U.S. rivalry, according to the Chinese diplomat, Washington is attempting to sever manufacturing chains and violate legal interests of Chinese businesses by means of imposing illicit sanctions.14
On May 23rd, before Blinken presented his report, President Biden published the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF)15; the next day, he participated in the U.S.-Australia-Japan-India Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD, which laid a foundation for a new Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness. Washington is solidifying its partnership with the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), with its seven members becoming founding members of the IPEF. This was further demonstrated by the visit of Joe Biden to Cambodia on November 12th of 2022, where, within the framework of the ASEAN summit, a joint statement was issued regarding ASEAN-U.S. Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.16
With regard to the geopolitical context, Washington’s strategic goal is to deter China in the Indo-Pacific region, the South and East China Seas, as well as the Taiwan Strait. Beijing is unhappy about the U.S.-Japanese alliance and various regional formats such as U.S.-Australia-Canada-New Zealand-UK intelligence alliance – “Five Eyes” (FVEY); U.S.-Australia-Japan-India Quadrilateral Dialogue – “QUAD”; U.S.-Australia-UK tripartite pact – “AUKUS”. This means that the epicentre of global tensions has shifted toward the Indo-Pacific region. China is particularly critical of AUKUS. Formed in 2021, AUKUS is viewed by China as a product of the U.S. Cold War mentality and narrow understanding of geopolitical concepts. Within the framework of this pact, the U.S. plans to supply Australia with nuclear-powered submarines, providing Canberra with the capability to patrol the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait, fully complying with the U.S. strategy of deterring China. Moreover, AUKUS is ready to protect Taiwan from aggression, which acts as another factor contributing to Beijing’s displeasure. Along with the AUKUS security pact, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) represents another cause of disagreement, with Taiwan expressing interest to join the partnership. Naturally, China is opposed to Taiwan’s entry as a party to the agreement.
The South China Sea represents a trade artery when it comes to transporting the majority of global energy and goods. These waters hold key significance for the transportation of the navy from the Indian to the Pacific Ocean and vice versa. The U.S. accuses China of militarizing the region; Washington believes that disputed areas of the South China Sea must remain neutral, ensuring freedom of movement for commercial shipping.
Taiwan represents the most delicate issue on the agenda of Sino-U.S. relations. China postulates the “One China Principle”, with 180 countries recognizing Beijing’s claim. Despite this, the Chinese leadership rather aptly believes that Washington and its allies often violate said principle, establishing official relations with the island republic, including in terms of military cooperation, with the final goal of supporting “Taiwan’s independence”. Washington is Taiwan’s main partner and security guarantor. Despite not having officially recognized Taiwanese (officially the Republic of China) sovereignty, the U.S. maintains close military, political, economic and humanitarian ties to the island. The U.S. also continues to fulfil obligations outlined in then China-US Three Joint Communiqués***, Taiwan Relations Act**** and the Six Assurances to Taiwan*****. Additionally, in 2018, the US Congress adopted the Taiwan Travel Act, which states that all US officials, regardless of their level and position, have the right to visit Taiwan and hold meetings with their Taiwanese colleagues, and vice versa.17 Later, in 2020, the US Congress adopted the Taipei Act, which encourages Taiwan’s contacts with other states and participation in the activity of international organisations.18 The last time the Taiwan strait saw significant escalation was in August of 2022, when the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, visited the island. China, in turn, conducted large-scale military exercises near Taiwanese shores, testing its ballistic missiles.19
The bilateral trade is one of the most important components of the Sino-U.S. relations. However, it no longer acts as a stabilising factor. On the contrary, attempts to use trade and finance disputes as political tools are becoming more and more apparent. China accuses the US of protectionism in trade. In turn, the U.S. criticises China for practicing “dishonest competition”. In 2021, the total turnover of the Sino-U.S. trade amounted to $657.5bn (China represents the third largest trading partner of the U.S.).20 U.S. exports amounted to $151.1bn (21.4% increase compared to the previous year), while Chinese exports constituted $506.4bn (16.5% increase compared to the previous year). Therefore, the trade deficit for the U.S. reached $355.3bn (14.5% increase compared to the previous year).21
On November 8th of 2022, President Joe Biden extended the executive orders issued by Donald Trump for another year. The orders concern the banning of U.S. investments in companies associated with the Chinese military-industrial complex; military, intelligence and security programmes; weapons and associated equipment manufacturing, etc. The use of Chinese spyware technologies (5G) is also considered a threat.22 Beijing deemed this decision politically motivated, damaging legal interests of global investors, as well as the Chinese manufacturing sector.23
The multitude of disagreements do not impede Washington and Beijing to cooperate on global issues for mutual benefit, including in terms of such 21st-century challenges as: terrorism, non-proliferation of WMDs, nuclear disarmament of the Korean peninsula, Iran’s nuclear programme, energy and financial security, the global food crisis, climate change, etc. This was reconfirmed on November 14th of 2022, during the G20 summit organized in Bali (Indonesia), where Xi Jinping and Joe Biden held a rather successful meeting, as the parties agreed to establish certain task groups in order to tighten communication lines between the two superpowers. The aforementioned task groups will focus on the implementation of decisions made by the two presidents, taking practical steps in terms of returning the development of Sino-U.S. relations to peaceful rails, renewing dialogue on climate change (terminated in August of 2022 after the visit of Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan).24
U.S. strategy for China is comprised of three key components: 1) investment in U.S. competitiveness, innovations and democracy; 2) coordination of efforts with allies and partner states, and joint action aimed at reaching common goals; 3) responsible competition with the People’s Republic of China in order to protect U.S. interests and formulate a vision for the future.25
According to the new National Security Strategy of the U.S., China and Russia are increasingly aligned with each other, however, the challenges they pose differ.26 The primary interest of the U.S. is to maintain the competitive edge over China, all while containing an extremely threatening Russia.27
On February 4th of 2022, before invading Ukraine, the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, visited China. The two leaders adopted a joint statement, which is directed against NATO and AUKUS, aiming to avoid military superiority of Washington and its allies in the Asia-Pacific region.28 This marked the first instance when China – also to the detriment of Ukraine – manifested its negative attitude toward NATO enlargement in an official document. Moreover, China supported Russia’s approach toward the renewal of the security architecture in Europe.
From the very onset of the war, Beijing refused to condemn Russia’s illegal aggression. Additionally, Xi Jinping even partially supported the Kremlin’s rhetoric, placing the blame for provoking the conflict on the U.S. and NATO, which further exacerbated the already tense relations between Beijing and Washington, as well as Brussels. On March 24th of 2022, in a joint statement made during the NATO summit, Western Leaders called on China to protect the existing international order and cease the dissemination of Kremlin’s false narratives regarding the War in Ukraine, and NATO.29 The approximation of Russian and Chinese positions is connected to their common interest of weakening the US. Including due to this reason, the two states represent temporary, situational allies, often acting in coordination when it comes to transforming the international order to their benefit. Chinese position regarding the Russo-Ukrainian War is as follows: China respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations, however takes into consideration the complicated historical context of the Ukrainian issue, along with the ‘legitimate’ security concerns shared by Russia. On the one hand, Beijing expresses its grievance over the situation in Ukraine, providing humanitarian aid. On the other hand, China continues to criticize the West for sanctioning Russia. In case Beijing decides side with and assist Russia in the conflict, the U.S. will most likely impose even stricter sanctions on China, ultimately resulting in negative geopolitical outcomes, especially for the global economy.
Despite the increasing interaction between China and Russia, there are neither legal agreements, nor a defence pact in place, which would determine the obligations of potential allies in terms of military cooperation. Due to this objective circumstance, Russo-Chinese relations can best be described as only situational (without the military component). It is noteworthy that against the backdrop of the Russian nuclear threat, China increasingly voices concern over the necessity to avoid nuclear confrontation. During the G20 summit in Bali, Xi Jinping agreed with Joe Biden that the use, as well as threats of use of nuclear weapons is unacceptable.30 The declaration of the G20 Summit shares the aforementioned sentiment.31 The German Chancellor, Olaf Scholz echoed the Chinese President’s position regarding the threats associated with the Eurasian nuclear crisis during his visit to Beijing.32
In 2021-2022 China presented its three global initiatives to the world: the Cooperation Initiative on Global Food Security; the Global Development Initiative; and the Global Security Initiative – GSI.
The first two initiatives mostly focus on economic matters. As for the latter initiative, presented by the Chinese President, Xi Jinping on April 21st of 2022, the focus is mainly on anti-Western rhetoric, which echoes in many ways the spirit of the aforementioned joint declaration issued by the Russian and Chinese Presidents on February 4th of 2021. The Initiative consists of six core principles.33 It is open for any country to join. Principle 3 of the document focuses on the unacceptability of the “Cold War Mentality” and “Bloc Confrontation”. The U.S. is not mentioned by name; however, it is beyond doubt that Beijing’s criticism is directed mainly toward Washington and its NATO allies. Principle 6 focuses on regional disputes and global challenges, including bio-security. No particular state is mentioned here either, however, it is well known that China accuses the U.S. of disseminating biological weapons using its bio-labs across various regions globally. “Principle of indivisible security” is the fourth principle of the document – President Putin has also used this principle as justification for his invasion of Ukraine. According to the said principle, security dilemmas must be resolved collectively. However, in case actions of any one nation pose security threats to other states, it would be considered a violation of the aforementioned principle. Considering all of the above, China and Russia believe that no state ought to seek to increase its security at the expense of others, as collective security remains to be the only form of balanced organisation for the sustainability of the European security architecture. Moscow and Beijing view the eastward enlargement of NATO, especially including Ukraine, as a clear threat to Russia’s security.
Unlike the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Global Security Initiative has not yet been institutionalized. At this point, GSI represents China’s only vision on the global security architecture. Within the framework of active diplomatic efforts exerted in the UN, China may attempt to coalesce a group of its supporting nations, in order to increase the influence of the Initiative.34 Additionally, against the backdrop of the current global crises, including the war in Ukraine, China will attempt to reduce the influence of NATO and other security alliances that are led by Washington. Therefore, as of this point, it seems unlikely that the above-mentioned initiative will be implemented on a regional or global scale in the short or mid-term perspective.
Along China’s path toward global leadership, Beijing’s main weakness seems to be the lack of official allies, and the virtual non-existence of the so-called security network (excluding North Korea).35 The U.S., on the contrary, enjoys a vast security network that is incomparably larger in terms of scale, structure or any other characteristic.36 Therefore, one of the potential strategic goals of the GSI may be to reverse these conditions.
Sino-U.S. relations represent the most important bilateral relations in today’s world. The conduct of these two superpowers is what largely determines the fate of the rest of the globe. Washington cooperates with Beijing across fields of mutual interest, finding it unacceptable for disagreements to disrupt the realisation of common priorities. The rivalry between the two states is to continue. The most important thing is for both parties to maintain control over their contention.
China’s actions are based on its national interests, among which two main dimensions can be identified. On the one hand, China wants to maintain pragmatic relations with Russia, its largest neighbour rich in natural resources and military technology On the other hand, China wants to deepen existing trade and economic ties, as well as technological connections with the U.S. and the rest of the developed West. Even before the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, Sino-U.S. relations would escalate periodically. Washington is unhappy Chinese Communist Party policies, especially in terms of the human rights violations in Xinjiang, Hong-Kong and Tibet. Thus, the U.S. is increasing pressure on Beijing, much to China’s displeasure. Furthermore, the issues of Taiwan, the South China Sea, etc. act as additional causes of disagreement.
Western constructs of security (NATO, FVEY, QUAD, AUKUS) represent countering platforms to those proposed by China and Russia (ОДКБ, ШОС). This creates a global security dilemma in the contemporary world. As for China’s GSI, open for any nation to join at will, it acts as an instrument for the delegitimization of the U.S. and NATO on the global stage. Due to the aforementioned factors, inter alia it would be difficult to institutionalise.
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-chinese-hackers-working-ministry-state-security-charged-global-computer-intrusion [4] U.S. Department of State. 2021. “Department Press Briefing – February 23.” https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-february-23-2021/ [5] MFA of Japan. 2021. “Joint Statement of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (Japan-U.S. “2+2”).” March 16, 2021. https://www.mofa.go.jp/na/st/page3e_001112.html [6] MFA of China. 2021. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian’s Regular Press Conference.” March 17, 2021. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/202103/t20210317_9721239.html [7] CNBC. 2021. “Here are the highlights from the heated exchange between the U.S. and China in Alaska.” March 19, 2021.https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/19/here-are-the-highlights-from-the-heated-us-china-exchange-in-alaska.html [8] MFA of China. 2022. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian’s Regular Press Conference.” May 9, 2022. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/202205/t20220509_10683549.html [9] Ibid. [10] Ibid. [11] U.S. Department of State. 2022. “The Administration’s Approach to the People’s Republic of China, A. J. Blinken, Secretary of State.” May 26, 2022. https://www.state.gov/the-administrations-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/ [12] Ibid. [13] O’Hanlon, E.M, Sisson, W.M. and Talmadge, C. 2022. “Managing the risks of US-China war: Implementing a strategy of integrated deterrence.” Brookings. September 2022. https://www.brookings.edu/research/managing-the-risks-of-us-china-war-implementing-a-strategy-of-integrated-deterrence/ [14] MFA of China. 2022. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin’s Regular Press Conference on May 27, 2022.”https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/202205/t20220527_10693733.html [15] The White House. 2022. “Statement on the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity.” May 23, 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/23/statement-on-indo-pacific-economic-framework-for-prosperity/ [16] The White House. 2022. “ASEAN-U.S. Leaders’ Statement on the Establishment of the ASEAN-U.S. Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.” November 12, 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/11/12/asean-u-s-leaders-statement-on-the-establishment-of-the-asean-u-s-comprehensive-strategic-partnership/ [17] Congress.gov. 2018. “An Act to encourage visits between the U.S. and Taiwan at all levels, and for other purposes/Taiwan Travel Act, PUBLIC LAW 115–135.” March 16, 2018. https://www.congress.gov/115/plaws/publ135/PLAW-115publ135.pdf [18] South China Morning Post. 2020. “Donald Trump signs TAIPEI Act to support Taiwan’s international relations.” March 27, 2020. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3077192/donald-trump-signs-taipei-act-support-taiwans-international?module=perpetual_scroll_0&pgtype=article&campaign=3077192 [19] Chen, K. 2022. “Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan causes an ongoing Chinese tantrum in the Taiwan Strait.” The Conversation, August 8, 2022. https://theconversation.com/nancy-pelosis-visit-to-taiwan-causes-an-ongoing-chinese-tantrum-in-the-taiwan-strait-188205 [20]U.S. Department of Commerce. 2021. “U.S. Trade with China.” https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/country-papers/2971-2021-statistical-analysis-of-u-s-trade-with-china/file [21] Ibid. [22] The White House. 2022. “Notice on the Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to the Threat from Securities Investments that Finance Certain Companies of China.” November 8, 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2022/11/08/notice-on-the-continuation-of-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-the-threat-from-securities-investments-that-finance-certain-companies-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china-2/ [23] MFA of China. 2022. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian’s Regular Press Conference.” November 9, 2022.
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/202211/t20221109_10891661.html [24] The New York Times. 2022. “U.S. and China Restart Climate Talks.” November 14, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/ 11/14/business/china-us-climate-change.html [25] The White House. 2022. U.S. National Security Strategy.” October 12, 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/ uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf [26] Ibid. [27] Ibid. [28] Kremlin. Ru. 2022. “Совместное Заявление Российской Федерации и Китайской Народной Республики о Международных отношениях, вступающих в новую эпоху, и глобальном устойчивом развитии.” 4 февраля 2022 года. http://kremlin.ru/supplement/5770 [29] NATO. 2022. “Statement by NATO Heads of State and Government.” March 24, 2022. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_193719.htm [30] The White House. 2022. “Readout of President Joe Biden’s Meeting with President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China.” November 14, 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/11/14/readout-of-president-joe-bidens-meeting-with-president-xi-jinping-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china/ [31] The White House. 2022. “G20 Bali Leaders’ Declaration.” November 16, 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/11/16/g20-bali-leaders-declaration/ [32] MFA of China. 2022. “President Xi Jinping Meets with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz.” November 4, 2022.https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202211/t20221104_10800546.html [33] Xinhua News Agency. 2022. “Xi Focus: Xi proposes Global Security Initiative.” April 21, 2022. https://english.news.cn/ 20220421/2c0c40da15af4dbeabb1df4d8a9911be/c.html [34] United States Institute of Peace. 2022. “Xi Kicks Off Campaign for a Chinese Vision of Global Security.” October 5, 2022. https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/10/xi-kicks-campaign-chinese-vision-global-security [35] Norrlof, C and Wohlforth. G. W. 2019. “Raison de l’Hégémonie (The Hegemon’s Interest): Theory of the Costs and Benefits of Hegemony.” Security Studies, 28(3);422-450, DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2019.1604982 [36] Ibid.
Notes:
* In December of 2017, President Trump presented the National Security Strategy, which refers to China as a long-term strategic competitor. On November 12th of 2020, Executive Order №13959 was issued by Trump, declaring state of emergency in order to eradicate threats faced by the U.S. foreign policy and economy. This was a result of the investments made by some Chinese companies in U.S. bonds. Joe Biden’s Executive Order №14032 issued on June 3rd of 2021 expanded the scope of the jurisdiction of the aforementioned Executive Order №13959. In October of 2022, the new National Security Strategy of the US presented by Joe Biden, referred to Beijing and Moscow as the main challenges faced by the U.S. Simultaneously, the document notes that China remains the only competitor for the U.S., with a clear goal to rearrange the existing international order and growing economic, diplomatic, military, and tech resources necessary.
** In 2019, the U.S. blacklisted “Huawei”, as the Communist Party of China enjoys direct access to information gathered by the company’s network. In 2020, sanctions were imposed upon the largest Chinese microchip manufacturing company – SMIC.
*** The Three China-U.S. Joint Communiqués: foundational documents of Sino-U.S. bilateral relations: Washington recognises Taiwan as a part of China as per the 1972 Communique; China and the U.S. established diplomatic relations as per the 1978 Communique (however the U.S. retained economic and cultural ties with Taiwan); the 1982 Communique reconfirmed the adherence of both parties to the aforementioned two documents.
**** Taiwan Relations Act: adopted by Congress in 1979, it is still in force and entails the protection and support of Taiwan, including in the field of security.
***** The Six Assurances to Taiwan: the six main principles of US relations with Taiwan. The document was attached to the above-mentioned 1982 Sino-US Communique, providing the guarantee that the U.S. will continue to support Taiwan, despite the termination of official diplomatic relations.
* Davit Pipinashvili – Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, Embassy of Georgia to the People’s Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia
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