NATO 2030 New Vision and Eastern Expansion Policy
Rati Asatiani
Abstract
In December of 2019 NATO leaders submitted a request to the Secretary General of the organization, Jens Stoltenberg, asking him to conduct a future-oriented reflexive process, in order to determine appropriate paths for the strengthening of the political dimension of NATO. The article below is based on the report, NATO 2030: United for a New Era, prepared for the Secretary General in November of 2020 by a group of independent experts, focusing on NATO’s vision for 2030, including the prospects of enlargement of the alliance and membership for Georgia and Ukraine.
The recent years have proved rather politically challenging for NATO. Apart from the undermining of the liberal international order by Russia and China, the distinctly negative attitude of the US President, Donald Trump, towards the alliance, due to the general dissatisfaction caused by most member-states missing the mark in terms of their financial obligations to the organization,1 negatively affected trans-Atlantic relations.2 There were also disagreements among European allies; the French President, Emmanuel Macron, directly noted the political and strategic inconsistencies within the organization,3 underlining the unilateral decision of Turkey to invade North-Eastern Syria without consulting with the Allies. He also noted the increased frequency of Trump’s critical remarks towards NATO.4
This overall geopolitical environment created the foundations for a process of internal reflection within NATO, which, in turn, necessitates the determining of paths towards political strengthening of the organization. In order to address said challenges, in April of 2020, Jens Stoltenberg founded an independent expert group, which aimed to support the NATO 2030 initiative, via the means of developing a new vision for strengthening the Alliance.
In accordance with these set objectives, in November of 2020, the Group presented the Secretary General with the following report: NATO 2030: United for a New Era. One of the recommendations presented concerned the maintenance of NATO’s strategic goals through the open doors policy, including through strengthening relations with existing partners such as Georgia and Ukraine.
This article deliberates upon the NATO 2030 vision and the organizations’ policy toward Eastern enlargement, describing NATO’s approach towards Georgia and Ukraine’s membership based on said document, and analyzing the particular international political factors that may impact NATO’s Eastern enlargement policy.
One of the goals of the NATO 2030 vision concerns the identification of the diverse set of threats and challenges faced by the organization, thus, renewing the 2010 Strategic Concept titled Active Engagement, Modern Defense.5 The agreement on the renewal of the Strategic Concept was made on June 14th of 2021 by NATO leaders during the summit in Brussels. The actual document will be developed within the framework of the next summit.6
The document notes that NATO will have to adapt to the new and, often, vague circumstances, as the following decade will differ from both the Cold-War as well as the post-Cold-War period. The new world will be one of increased competition among state actors, within the framework of which authoritarian states will attempt to expand their zones of influence; a world, where the democratic allies will, once again, have to respond to systemic challenges to security and the economy. Terrorism will remain a threat; new risks, such as pandemics, technological and climate change will also have to be taken into consideration.
It is interesting that the report includes a separate sub-chapter concerning just two states: Russia and China. This underscores the expert opinion regarding the significance of NATO’s relations with the aforementioned pair of states.
Said sub-chapter is titled – “Strengthening NATO’s Political Role and Tools with regard to Emerging Threats and Challenges from Every Direction”. The experts regard Russia and China as a threat in the worst-case-scenario, and a challenge in the best-case-scenario. Nevertheless, it must be noted that according to the recommendations laid out in the document, “NATO should continue the dual-track approach of deterrence and dialogue, within parameters agreed at the Wales and Warsaw Summits, as the basis for its approach toward Russia.”7
Considering all of the above, as noted in the document, the following decade will see the revival of significance of collective action in terms of ensuring physical security and viability of democracy in Europe and North America. In order to strengthen the effectiveness of NATO’s aforementioned function it would be necessary to remain adaptive to new developments. Therefore, the issue of membership of Georgia and Ukraine, along with the position of said two states towards Russia, must be assessed through this prism. This will result in increased significance, relevance and appreciation for Georgia and Ukraine within the framework of NATO’s agenda.
In terms of enlargement the document notes that the Open Door policy must be maintained and reviewed. This, it can be argued, represents a fundamental part of the Alliance’s policy. It is underscored that partnership between NATO and non-member states acts as a significant tool for security, knowledge and information-sharing, as well as cooperation and capability development in general:
“Doors must remain open for all democratic European states, which aspire towards membership and are able to shoulder the responsibility as a member state if admitted, contributing to North Atlantic security. Partnership is not a substitution for membership, as only the latter entails access to article 5 […] NATO must continue its work with aspiring partners to establish deeper, more essential relations in order to ensure regional stability.”8
The recommendations of the sub-chapter on political consultation with partners outlines that NATO must actively seek new partnerships that significantly and clearly support the solution of strategic priority issues, further developing existing ones.
After the end of the Cold War the admission of Eastern European states into the Alliance represented an act of filling in the political vacuum left behind by the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It can be argued that Georgia and Ukraine remain in said vacuum to this day – they are, on the one hand, oriented towards the West, while, on the other hand, unable to leave Russia’s zone of influence, due to military and political reasons. Currently these two states are considered neither fully Western, nor within the sphere of Russian influence. This, in turn, further exacerbates the difficulty concerning the Soviet legacy of unresolved national security problems both in terms of domestic development and the lack of prosperity in general.
The Kremlin, hell-bent on retaining regional hegemony, finds itself rather comfortable in this situation, attempting to hinder the development of post-Soviet states, curbing their Euro-Atlantic aspirations. To that end, the Russian aggression against Georgia and Ukraine continues, including via the means of creation and maintenance of ‘frozen conflicts’ with so called quasi-states that act as Russia’s satellite entities.
Chief among the recommendations, outlined in the document, underscores the significance of NATO’s relations with its partners, noting that, in order to achieve the Alliance’s strategic goals, NATO must maintain and deepen its Open Door policy.
It is noteworthy that partnership with Georgia and Ukraine is discussed in a separate clause, which states the following: “NATO should seek to expand and strengthen partnerships with Ukraine and Georgia as vulnerable democracies that seek membership and are under constant external and internal pressure from Russia.”9 Another recommendation on this subject notes that NATO must increase its support for partners that declare their aspiration for membership in the Alliance, in order to support their integration, including via the means of developing and undertaking of the necessary tools and reforms, and working with the political, military, civic and administrative structures of the partner states.10 The document also notes that “NATO should remain committed to 2008 Bucharest decisions and elevate the importance of membership negotiations to a higher level.”11
It must be noted that after the 2008 Bucharest Summit and 2014 Wales Summit, NATO-Georgian and NATO-Ukrainian relations continue to deepen in terms of practical cooperation. The Alliance cooperates with both states in terms of ensuring Black Sea security, including via means of conducting joint military drills. NATO and partners have also been strengthening cooperation across the dimension of hybrid threats, conducting joint exercises and training sessions, which elevate compatibility of said partners with NATO standards.
NATO members regularly underscore Georgia’s and Ukraine’s “right to independently determine their future and foreign policy course, free from external intervention”,12 noting the progress achieved by said states in terms of political and military harmonization with NATO. Nevertheless, in order to further deepen the aforementioned relations and solidify the Euro-Atlantic aspiration of the partner states, it is important for both Georgia and Ukraine to continue undertaking democratic reforms, while practically cooperating with the Alliance. This will, on the one hand, support the process of solidifying political consensus among member-states regarding the admission of the two partner-states, while, on the other hand, simultaneously preparing Georgia and Ukraine for membership.
The next decade may well be a period of increased geopolitical rivalry among great powers and significant international organizations, with the West diverting more and more of its attention toward Russia and China’s aggressive foreign policy and authoritarian domestic policy. Considering the above, the strategic geographic location of Georgia and Ukraine will grow in importance for their Western partners. It is noteworthy that this attitude can be found in both the document analyzed in this paper and in the agenda of the Brussels NATO Summit held on 14th of June.11 Namely the Georgian issue, alongside that of Ukraine, made an entry in the chapter named “Supporting the Rules-based International Order”, which outlines the necessity for deeper cooperation with NATO partners that share common values with the Alliance. The agenda notes that “within the framework of the NATO 2030 vision, allies will consider further deepening ties with partners located both near and far that share the position of the Alliance.”12
Overall, considering the political processes on the international arena, the recommendations outlined in the document concerning Georgia and Ukraine provide the basis for the following assumption: strategic significance of these two states for NATO will only continue to increase. This may strengthen their ties with the Alliance, with Georgia and Ukraine receiving the Membership Action Plan (MAP), ultimately resulting in the attainment of political consensus among the allies regarding their membership.
* Rati Asatiani – First Secretary, General Directorate of Press, Information and Public Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia
Contents
Georgia’s European Path From Declared Aspirations of Membership to Official Accession Goal
Eka Pkhovelishvili
Russian Disinformation Campaigns and the Role of Strategic Communications in Planning Successful Foreign Policy
Mariam Orjonikidze
NATO 2030 New Vision and Eastern Expansion Policy
Rati Asatiani