A New Wave of NATO Enlargement: Russian Response and Capabilities of Aspirant States
Abstract
The following article discusses the shifts in the security architecture of the European continent and the geopolitical significance of the latest wave of NATO enlargement against the backdrop of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The paper also focuses on Russia’s relatively soft response to the accession of Finland and Sweden into the organisation. Simultaneously, the path taken by Finland and Sweden toward membership and its importance for aspirant states is also analysed.
Irine Khuluzauri
The 24th of February of 2022 marked the start of the first full-scale war on the European continent since WWII. Russia’s actions directed against Ukraine clearly elucidated that the Kremlin’s expansionist policies remain unchanged, with its security policy resting, among other things, upon the cornerstone doctrines of deterrence of NATO enlargement and weakening of Western influence.
“Along the endless policy of expansion, NATO has also gone beyond its geographically determined Euro-Atlantic zone, increasingly attempting to become involved in international issues and control the global security order, expanding its influence across various regions of the world, which, naturally, requires our attention.” – stated the Kremlin spokesperson in May of 2022 during an anniversary summit of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO)1.
Despite Russia’s aforementioned approach, the unjustifiable war waged by Putin against Ukraine resulted in what the Kremlin fears the most – further expansion of NATO, edging closer to Russia’s borders. Having remained neutral for over 200 years, Sweden, along with Finland (also non-aligned since WWII), took the historic decision to join the alliance.
Nevertheless, Moscow’s response to this decision was less severe compared to the case of Ukraine and Georgia in 2008. The article discusses the determining factors behind Russian decision-making, as well as the visible inconsistencies in policy-making in this regard; additionally, the geopolitical outcomes of this latest wave of NATO enlargement is analysed; finally, the significance of the path taken by Sweden and Finland before final accession for nations aspiring to full membership is deliberated upon.
The Russian president stated as far back as 2007 during the Munich Security Conference that NATO enlargement had nothing to do with the organisation’s modernisation, or ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, according to Vladimir Putin, the expansion of the Alliance represented a serious provocation diminishing levels of mutual trust between the West and Russia.2
Russia’s revisionist foreign policy first emerged in 2008, when the Kremlin’s war of aggression perpetrated against Georgia showed the international community that Moscow’s neighbours might become victims of military intervention if they aspire to make independent foreign policy and choose security alliances. Russia’s involvement in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea six years later falls into an identical pattern.
In order to understand Kremlin’s actions better, one needs to analyse the well-known Primakov Doctrine, formulated by the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, according to which, Russian domination in the post-Soviet space is necessary, while Russia’s interests must be unequivocally taken into consideration by the former Soviet Union republics. Moreover, the doctrine underlines the strategically important issue of deterring NATO enlargement along Russia’s borders.3
Starting from the 18th century, Russia’s key interest was focused on countries populated by Slavic and/or Orthodox Christian peoples. The outlined period saw the emergence of the political ideology of Pan-Slavism. According to this ideology, particular significance is attributed to the revival of the “Holy Russia”, which encompasses Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian populations. This is precisely the ideological basis exploited by the Kremlin in this war, which is also confirmed by the fact that the Russian government relocated over a million Ukrainians deep into Russian territory since the commencement of the military invasion.4
For a large segment of the Russian population, Ukraine does not represent an independent state and is rather a continuation of the Slavic union. It must also be noted that Russians do not view the Soviet Union as an “evil experiment” that should have never occurred; instead most believe it to be a noble initiative, the ideals of which were betrayed.6
Considering all of the above, it becomes clearer, why Russia responded toward the accession of Sweden and Finland into NATO in a more restrained manner while being determined to thwart Kiev’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations. It must also be noted that retaining influence over former members of the Soviet Union and deterring them from joining the alliance by means of violating their sovereignty is a top priority for Russia in terms of foreign policy, due to the fact that Russia’s power cannot otherwise be legitimized.7
According to the statement of the Russian President, Sweden and Finland’s accession into NATO differs from that of Ukraine, as Russia does not have territorial disputes with the Scandinavians. Nevertheless, according to Putin, if Sweden and Finland allow NATO to place its military and equipment on their territory, it will force Russia to respond appropriately in response.8
When discussing the moderate statements made by Russia toward the Scandinavian states, it must be underscored that prior to their accession into the alliance, both countries received security guarantees from the U.S. and the UK.9 The UK signed security declarations with both states, according to which in case of an attack on any one country, states party to the aforementioned document will “upon the request of the assailed party, support each other in various ways that may also include military aid.”10
It must also be noted that several days after Helsinki declared its intention to join NATO, Russia announced that it would halt supplies of natural gas to Finland.11 Therefore, it can be argued that despite Russia’s relatively mild rhetoric, Sweden and Finland remain on the Kremlin’s radar in terms of potential provocations, especially hybrid warfare. Thus, the alliance must be ready to respond to such challenges.
Started on the 24th of February of 2022, Russia’s cruel and unprovoked war against Ukraine changed the international security architecture. It is evident that Europe faces the largest security threat since WWII. The war resulted in humanitarian, food and energy crises; furthermore, the world now faces the risk of outright nuclear war.
European economies took a huge hit; rising prices for energy sources put energy security of the continent under risk. Russia’s decision to halt supplies of natural gas to several EU members only further exacerbated the already difficult situation.12
The war caused a dramatic decrease in grain exports from both Ukraine and Russia, resulting in a global food crisis in turn, which was followed by diplomatic efforts to mitigate the damages with the Black Sea Grain Initiative.13 Over the last year, inflation surpassed 10% in the Euro-zone.14 The increased volume of refugees fleeing from the conflict to various European countries is also notable. According to the International Migration Agency, currently there are approximately 7.8 million Ukrainians living in Europe.15
The new geopolitical realities on the European continent resulted in the mobilisation of European states around the issues of security and defence, causing a re-evaluation of energy policy. Said states strengthened their cooperation over the aforementioned issues, increasing spending on defence and security. Additionally, the EU developed a strategy to gradually decrease energy dependency on Russia and diversify energy suppliers.16 The military, financial and humanitarian aid provided by European states and the US to Ukraine is also important. Furthermore, NATO significantly increased its military presence on its Eastern frontier.17
The war of aggression perpetrated by Russia against Ukraine proved pivotal for the Northern European states in terms of making the decision to integrate into NATO fully. Conclusions were drawn clearly: if Putin can slaughter his “Slavic brothers and sisters” in Ukraine, there is nothing stopping him from doing the same elsewhere. “The 9th wave of NATO enlargement will go down in history as “expansion at Putin’s merit”. Had Russia not invaded Ukraine, no such development would have taken place.” – notes the former Prime Minister of Finland, Aleksandr Stubb.18
Swedish and Finnish governments officially submitted their accession applications on May 18th of 2022, launching the diplomatic process, which is expected to culminate in the attainment of full membership of the alliance for both states. Nevertheless, several obstacles have materialised despite majority consensus. All member-states have already ratified Sweden and Finland’s accession protocols except for Hungary and Turkey.
It is noteworthy that the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s party blocked a proposal aiming to speed up the process of Swedish and Finnish accession in the Hungarian parliament. Hungary’s position can be explained by the “warm” relations between Budapest and Moscow, and Hungary’s detachment from the EU. Hungary’s position regarding the sanctions imposed upon Russia by the EU, as well as the general EU policy toward Moscow became clear in the recent period. Nevertheless, according to the statement of the Hungarian leader, accession protocols of Sweden and Finland will be ratified in early 2023.19
It is also notable that Turkey, initially reluctant to green-light Swedish and Finnish integration into the alliance, eventually changed its position. The change occurred after a tripartite memorandum was signed, according to which Sweden and Finland agreed to halt their support toward Kurdish and Gűlenist factions, lift the military embargo imposed upon Turkey, and discuss the topic of extraditing/deporting individuals convicted of terrorism.20 After ratifying the accession protocol by Hungary and Turkey, Sweden and Finland will officially become NATO members.
The accession of these two states into the alliance has great strategic significance for the European security architecture. According to the former Prime Minister of Finland, Alexandr Stubb, “Finnish and Swedish membership in NATO is beneficial for the Baltic Sea region, NATO and European security in general.”21
It must be noted that if Finland and Sweden become full-fledged members of the alliance, NATO’s access to their territory will decrease the effectiveness of a potential Russian offensive. The only losing party is Russia: Russia’s position will be tangibly weakened in the north Eastern Europe, which is naturally of great significance for European security.22
The expansion of the Alliance will provide more security for the Baltic States. The three states in question have long been working on a defence strategy, expressing distress over the fact that Russia has the capabilities to occupy Finnish and Swedish islands in the Baltic (especially when it comes to the isle of Gotland) that can be used as launching pads for further offensives against the Baltic States.23
Finnish and Swedish accession will also strengthen NATO’s deterrence policy in the Arctic, where Russia has heavily invested in both military and commercial infrastructure. Their accession will unify all Arctic states but Russia, providing the alliance with the ability to pursue a more coherent strategy in the region.24
When discussing the compatibility of the aforementioned two states with NATO, it must be noted that both Finland and Sweden represent NATO partners, participating in NATO military drills (in the Baltic Sea region), while also being engaged in crisis management operations across the planet. Simultaneously, Finland and Sweden possess high-tech military equipment and advanced armed forces. Additionally, considering their centuries-long experience of fighting Russia, these countries could help develop novel and clear approaches toward defence and deterrence in the region.
The accession of these states is also important within the Georgian context. First, it must be noted that Finland and Sweden are firm supporters of Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, as well as its European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations. It must also be underscored that Sweden was one of the co-founders (along with Poland) of the Eastern Partnership Initiative. Therefore, if said states join the alliance, it will increase the number of supporters of Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations within it.25
Simultaneously, the accession of the above-mentioned countries would evidence NATO’s resilience in the face of Russian threats, as the alliance remains loyal to its Open Door Policy. This would create a promising prospect for Georgia, as well as Ukraine. Furthermore, this process would demonstrate that NATO could increase its engagement in the region even amid Russia’s threats. Additionally, the fact that Finland and Sweden received security guarantees prior to their accession sends an important message for countries like Georgia and Ukraine, confirming that there are prospects for the leading aspirant nations to receive such security guarantees before they become full-fledged members.
The new strategic concept adopted at the Madrid NATO Summit outlines the shifting regional geopolitical environment, as well as the long-term response of the alliance to the dangers that it faces. The document underscores that the Russian Federation represents the main and direct threat to the alliance. “The most important revision of the collective defence and deterrence policy since the end of the Cold War”, – is the assessment of the decisions made during the Madrid Summit by the Secretary General of NATO, Jens Stoltenberg.26
The document is also very important for Georgia. It reiterates the relevance of the Open Door Policy as well as the prospect of Georgia’s eventual accession into the alliance, based on the decisions made during the Bucharest Summit of 2008. The concept also states that all nations retain their sovereign right to freely choose and conduct foreign policy without any form of external interference
Additionally, it is noteworthy that that amid the war in Ukraine, states that are vulnerable toward Russian aggression (Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina) will receive more practical support from the Alliance in terms of strengthening their defence capabilities.27
Decisions made regarding Georgia support the strengthening of Georgia’s defence capabilities and security, bringing Georgia closer to its final goal of full-fledged NATO membership.
It is evident that Russia’s aggressive goals do not merely focus on Ukraine’s membership in NATO. The Kremlin’s actions serve the purpose of breaking Europe up into zones of influence. Putin envisages the return to what Russia lost 30 years ago.
Factors analysed in this article illustrate that Russia is particularly sensitive to the accession of former Soviet republics into NATO, along with the general increase in the influence of the West in the area it considers its backyard.
Against the backdrop of Russia’s unjustified and cruel war in Ukraine, we are witnessing an unprecedented unity among Western countries, and further strengthening of transatlantic unity.
The accession of two neutral states into the alliance underlines the fact that regional geopolitical realities have completely shifted. NATO is, in turn, ready to defend its positions and security by means of taking decisive steps toward enlargement in the north-eastern direction, sending a clear message to the Russian Federation that it is being punished for launching a war against Ukraine, facing the exact scenario it wanted to avoid.
It must be particularly underscored that the ongoing process of NATO enlargement does not represent a threat to any country. The goal is to ensure stability and encourage cooperation, establish peace and common democratic values. Unlike Russia, NATO does not seek to occupy or annex any nation. NATO guarantees peace and democracy, while Russia acts as the creator of conflicts.
Politico. November 24, 2022. https://www.politico.eu/article/viktor-orban-hungary-ratification-finland-sweden-nato-membership-2023-postponed/ [20] Sabbagh, D. 2022.”Turkey lifts objections to Finland and Sweden’s Nato bid.” The Guardian, June 28, 2022. https://amp.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/28/turkey-lifts-objections-to-finland-and-swedens-nato-bid [21] Stubb, A. 2022. “Nato entry for Finland and Sweden will enhance European security.” The Financial Times, May 11, 2022. https://www.ft.com/content/e85825af-5172-44c4-9662-f7ceca40e8ac [22] Bond, I. 2022.“Judy Asks: Is Finnish and Swedish NATO Membership Useful for European Security?” Carnegie Europe. April 28, 2022. https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/87010?fbclid=IwAR3RqFB_SEur1q68o_qT5fxyiD_txtmSDgANpx4mxj4fy7xeC_Lo6Nr-XUY [23] Masters, J. 2022. “How NATO Will Change If Finland and Sweden Become Members“. Carnegie Europe, June 29, 2022. https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/how-nato-will-change-if-finland-and-sweden-become-members [24] Masters, J. 2022. “How NATO Will Change If Finland and Sweden Become Members.” Council on Foreign Relations. June 29, 2022. https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/how-nato-will-change-if-finland-and-sweden-become-members [25] Deni, R. J.2022. “Sweden and Finland are on their way to NATO membership. Here’s what needs to happen next.” Atlantic Council. August 22, 2022. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/finland-and-sweden-in-nato-looking-beyond-madrid/ [26] Garamone, J. 2022. “NATO Secretary General Previews ‘Transformative’ Madrid Summit.” June 27, 2022. https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3075753/nato-secretary-general-previews-transformative-madrid-summit/ [27] NATO. 2022. “NATO 2022 Strategic Concept.” 29 June 2022. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf
* Irine Khuluzauri – II Secretary, Department of Press and Information, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia
Contents
Georgia’s European Perspective: New Impetus for Institutional and Quotidian Integration
Teimuraz Janjalia
The West’s Response to Russia’s War against Ukraine – an Analysis of Military, Political, Economic and Normative Aspects
Giorgi Robakidze
A New Wave of NATO Enlargement: Russian Response and Capabilities of Aspirant States
Irine Khuluzauri